

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
Washington, December 8, 1941.

Memorandum for Senator Welles:

I have sent the following letter to Wendell Wilkie. I will let you know what he says.

F. D. R.

Enclosure.

Transmitting copy of President's letter of 12/5/41 to Hon. Wendell Wilkie, in the appt. of Mr. Wilkie as a Special Representative of the President to the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and Australia.

## EXHIBIT NO. 112

### DISPATCHES AND OTHER MATERIAL REFERRED TO IN FOOTNOTES TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STATEMENT

#### (1) Dispatches and Other Material Referred to in Footnotes in Admiral Kimmel's Statement

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<sup>1</sup> Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

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<sup>1</sup> Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

[1] CinC File No.

P16-3/(0217)

Confidential

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., February 7, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Recommended Complements.

Reference: (a) Secnav Rest. ltr. FS/S80/(400525) of 1 June 1940.

Enclosures:

- (A) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C) (04447) of 21 December 1940 (Recommended complements for Battleships).
- (B) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C) (035) of 18 January 1941 (Recommended complements for Aircraft Carriers, and Tenders and Seaplane Tenders).
- (C) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C) (04) of 4 January 1941 (Recommended complements for Heavy Cruisers).
- (D) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C) (046) of 25 January 1941 (Recommended complements for Light Cruisers, BROOKLYN and ST. LOUIS class).
- (E) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C) (049) of 28 January 1941 (Recommended complements for Light Cruisers, OMAHA Class).
- (F) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16(C) (04551) of 31 December 1940 (Recommended complements for Destroyers).
- (G) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1(C) (024) of 11 January 1941 (Recommended complements for Light Mine Layers, Fleet Mine Sweepers, Submarines, Submarine Auxiliaries and Train Ships).
- (H) Combasefor Conf. ltr. P16-1/MM/(0103) of 22 January 1941 (Proposed compliments for ships of the Train).
- (I) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. ltr. P16-1/S1(C) (026) of 14 January 1941.

1. The additional armaments which have been placed on combatant ships in accordance with the directive established by reference (a), and the need for manning additional stations incident to reported experience in the present war, required that consideration be given to increasing the complement of ships to meet these added war-time requirements.

[2] 2. Enclosures (A) to (G), forwarded herewith, are the reports of the "Fleet Personnel Board" with Rear Admiral R. A. Theobald, U. S. Navy, as



Senior Member, appointed to determine the complement required to fight and maintain ships of the included types in accordance with the above requirements. These reports are submitted after the board had held exhaustive hearings and made a thorough study for each type. Before arriving at their conclusion the Board took the following steps:

(a) Members of the Board visited each type of ship and observed the stationing of the crews, the manning of batteries and the supplying of ammunition.

(b) Provided for the maximum utilization of the services of each man on board.

(c) Included the assignment of all available flag personnel to ships' battle stations.

(d) In so far as possible considered every phase of battle and justified the demand for each additional man.

3. The Commander-in-Chief concurs in the recommendations of the Board regarding all the complements necessary to fight the ships efficiently, subject to the following comments:

(a) Further study after submission of the report on destroyers, enclosure (F), by the Board makes the following modification in the recommendations for high speed minesweepers (DMs) advisable:

(1) HOVEY and LONG. Increase number of Seamen second class recommended to 10 (add 3) to make total complement 146.

(2) HOPKINS. Decrease number of Seamen first class recommended to one (decrease by 2) and number of Seamen second class to 4 (decrease by 3) to make total complement 138.

(b) The total complement of the Fleet minesweepers (AMs), enclosure (G), may be reduced from 96 to 85. This may be effected by reducing the recommended number of Seamen first class from 16 to 11, and Seamen second class from 18 to 13, [3] and Mess Attendant second class from 1 to 0. This would eliminate the 7 non-watchstanders in Condition II, and require the Type Commander to make readjustments in the stationing of personnel to operate without the other four.

In connection with the recommended complements for Train ships, enclosure (H) is submitted for consideration.

4. The major part of the increases recommended result directly from personnel required to man the additional armament installed in compliance with reference (a), and to provide for increased demands for battle lookouts.

5. A considerable part of the increases result also from the studies made by the Board of the ammunition supply for previously existing armament. The result of these studies and comments thereon are included in enclosure (I). Particular attention is invited to this enclosure, and to the increased number of men required in the ammunition train as a result of this study.

6. The information furnished by the Department regarding the numbers of men assigned to ships of the various types in the British Navy is of great interest. From the differences in complements of similar types in the two services, the following is apparent:

(a) British ships are mechanized to a considerably greater extent than our,

(b) They accept much lower rates of fire or standards of performance than we are willing to accept.

7. We are forced to operate our ships as they are and the number of men required to man them has been determined by the considered judgement of the best officers we have available. In view of the large numbers of men required for newly commissioned ships, both now and in the future, and in view of the fact that only at sea can men-of-warshipmen be adequately trained, every seagoing ship should be filled to capacity now. In this connection it cannot be too strongly emphasized that stabilization of personnel, both officers and enlisted, will contribute more to the efficiency of the fleet than any other single factor.

[4] 8. The study of the Board definitely indicates that the recommended complements can be housed and fed and, until conclusively proved otherwise, should be accepted.

9. Subject to the comments made in this letter, it is recommended that the complements contained in enclosures (A) to (G) inclusive be approved and that the additional men be assigned as quickly as possible by the Bureau of Navigation.

10. By copy of this letter, Force and Type Commanders will initiate necessary changes in existing ships to provide for the additional complement.







directed, and they will expedite their proceedings. I cannot urge you too strongly to fill the ships to capacity with both enlisted men and officers.

I request that you kindly show this letter to Admiral Stark.

My kindest personal regards and best wishes.

Most sincerely yours,

s/ Kimmel  
H. E. KIMMEL.

Rear Admiral C. W. NIMITZ, U. S. Navy,  
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation,  
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

[7] 4 April 1941

Top secret

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Info: CINCLANT, COMBATFOR, COMSCOFOR, COMBASEFOR, COMDTS  
NAVY YARDS BOSTON, PORTSMOUTH, NEW YORK, PHILADEL-  
PHIA, NORFOLK, CHARLESTON, MARE ISLAND, PEARL HARBOR,  
PUGET SOUND, NAD PUGET SOUND, MARE ISLAND, OAHU &  
CAVITE

Ø417ØØ

Except DESDIV 5Ø (S-27, S-28 and NTS) vessels on routine supply trips fill allowances and obtain supplies required for mobilization. At discretion fleet commanders will accept final increment of mobilization supply ammunition. Strip ship in accordance with orders action Adees. Ships assigned availability for drydocking at Addees discretion. For this purpose ships of the Pacific Fleet are not to return to mobilization ports on the continent.

[8] 48

Copy

In reply refer to initials and No. Serial 033612

Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
Washington, April 3, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

Subject: Observations on the present international situation.

1. You are requested to disclose the contents of this letter to your seconds in command and to your chiefs of staff, and to no other persons.

2. Staff conversations with the British have been completed and a joint United States-British war plan drawn up. Two copies of the Report (Short title ABC-1) of these conversations are being supplied each addressee by officer messenger. Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, founded on the United States-British plan, is in preparation and will be distributed at an early date. The general nature of Rainbow No. 5 will become evident to you upon perusal of the joint Report. This Report has been approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army and by myself, and, at an appropriate time, is expected to receive the approval of the President. You are authorized to discuss matters pertaining to Rainbow No. 5 with other officers of the Army and the Navy, as may be appropriate.

3. The basic idea of the United States-British plan is that the United States will draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reenforce the Atlantic Fleet, and that the British will, if necessary, transfer naval forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the Malay Barrier. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet would not be reenforced, but would be supported by offensive operations by the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

4. From the viewpoint of the defense of the United States national position, the proposed naval deployment gives adequate security in case the British Isles should fall. From the viewpoint of bringing immediate heavy pressure in the Atlantic, which we consider the decisive theater, the plan leaves something to be desired in the initial stages of the war.



[9] 5. The difficulties are our present uncertainty as to Japanese action, and British insistence on the vital importance of holding Singapore, and of supporting Australia, New Zealand, and India. Their proposals, which I rejected, were to transfer almost the whole of the Pacific Fleet to Singapore to hold that position against the Japanese. In my opinion, the result of such a move on our part would almost surely be a British defeat in the Atlantic, and, thereafter, a difficult period for the United States. I have agreed to the present plan for the initial stages, but have insisted that the deployment at any one time must depend upon the situation which exists at that time. Elasticity and fluidity of planning are therefore assured.

6. There seem to be two principal dangers which immediately threaten the United Kingdom. The first is the very grave threat to its sea communications from submarines, aircraft, and raiders. The recent activity of the large German naval raiders foreshadows a wider, and even weaker, deployment of British surface forces capable of dealing with such raiders. The British are badly deficient in anti-submarine escort craft, and have as yet devised little defense of convoys and single ships against heavy bombers. Shipping is now being lost about three times as fast as it can be replaced. The only remedy, in my opinion, is a radical strengthening of the defense against all three forms of shipping attack, by greater forces and new ideas, to such an extent that the hazard to the attackers will be too great for them to overcome. The entire United States naval strength could be usefully employed in the Atlantic, were it to become possible to send it there.

7. The second great danger is the continued deterioration of British production and morale through heavy bombing. This will become more serious as shipping losses become greater. At the same time the situation in the Mediterranean might become dangerous at any time; on the other hand, in spite of uncertainties, favorable elements are visible in that theater.

8. The Japanese attitude will continue to have an extremely important bearing on the future of the war in the Atlantic. For some time past, Japan has shown less and less inclination to attack the British, Dutch, and ourselves in the Far East. Her people are distinctly tired of the war in China and of the privations they now must undergo. Whether Matsuoka's visit to Berlin and Rome will strengthen the wish of some of them to help Germany, or will deepen their caution against rash action, may be disclosed within the next month. I advise you to watch this situation keenly.

[10] 9. Unquestionably the concentration of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii has had a stabilizing effect in the Far East. I am more and more of opinion that Japan will hesitate to take further steps, perhaps even against Indo-China, so long as affairs do not go too badly for Britain. What the effect on her would be were the United States to transfer a large part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic can, as yet, be only surmised. In any case, we shall rigidly avoid making any indication that we contemplate such a transfer until the last possible moment.

10. The question as to our entry into the war now seems to be *when*, and not *whether*. Public opinion, which now is slowly turning in that direction, may or may not be accelerated. My own personal view is that we may be in the war (possibly undeclared) against Germany and Italy within about two months but that there is a reasonable possibility that Japan may remain out altogether. However, we can not at present act on that possibility.

11. Your Operating Plan for Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 3 will, with little change, be equally effective for Rainbow No. 5. I advise you to study the Report of the staff conversations in order that you will be in a position to issue your new plans as soon as practicable after receipt of the new Basic Plan, and, if war comes before you receive it, so that you can promptly modify your present orders.

12. In the meantime, I advise that you devote as much time as may be available to training your forces in the particular duties which the various units may be called upon to perform under your operating plans. The time has arrived, I believe, to perfect the technique and the methods that will be required by the special operations which you envisage immediately after the entry of the United States into war.

/s/ H. R. Stark  
H. R. STARK.

cc: Rear Admiral Ghormley.



[11]

*Secret*

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
Washington, May 26, 1941.

Op-12B-5-McC  
(SC)A16(R-5)  
Serial 060512

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Distribution List for WPL-46.

Subject: Promulgation of Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46).

Enclosures: (A) Pages for WPL-46, Registered No. 47, including List of Effective Pages.

(B) Receipt form in duplicate.

1. Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46) is promulgated herewith.
2. Report receipt, and check of contents, on the form provided as enclosure (B).
3. The highest priority in the preparation of war plans is assigned to plans required by WPL-46.
4. It is desired that the preparation and distribution of these plans be accomplished with the least possible delay. To this end, all planning based upon the directives of WPL-13, WPL-14, WPL-42, and WPL-44 will be discontinued until plans based upon WPL-46 are completed.
5. Appendix II, Chapter IX, prescribing the composition of the Naval Transportation Service will be issued as a change to this plan. If this plan is executed prior to the issue of Chapter IX, specific directives will be issued to provide for the initial sea transportation requirements of the plan.
6. The extreme importance of the security of this Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, cannot be over-emphasized. In this respect, attention is invited to the instructions contained in "The System of War Planning", and in the "Registered Publication Manual".
7. Plans and estimates of requirements for the preparation for war service of vessels to be taken over from private sources, as indicated in the tables of Appendix II, will be classified as confidential. Attention is invited to paragraph 1105 of WPL-8.

Original, May, 1941 WPL-46

[12] 8. This plan shall not be carried in aircraft except by authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, and when not in use shall be kept in Class "A" stowage as prescribed in the "Registered Publication Manual".

9. It is forbidden to make extracts from or copy portions of this publication without specific authority from the Chief of Naval Operations, except in subordinate plans based upon this publication.

H. R. STARK.

[13] *Secret*  
Cincpac file no.  
A16/WPPac-46 (16)  
Serial 063W

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 25, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.

Subject: WPPac-46.

1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect prior to the receipt of such approval.

2. Attention is invited to the Introduction, Chapter III, article 0301 of the Plan concerning the preparation of supporting plans by Task Force Commanders. At the present time it is desired that the following submit supporting plans for approval by the Commander-in-Chief:

Commanders Task Forces Two, Three, Six, Seven and Nine. (Commander Task Force Nine may, if he desires, delegate preparation of the plan to the Senior Officer of that type in the Hawaiian Area.)



The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers addressed may provide for the accomplishment of such tasks as are assigned them in this O-1 Plan by including suitable measures in their O-4 or other plans, rather than to prepare separate supporting plans for this O-1 Plan. The Commander Southeast Pacific Force (Commander Cruiser Division Three) is required to submit the plan for operations of that force after its detachment from the Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations for approval.

3. Supporting Plans as required above will be submitted for approval of the Commander-in-Chief prior to 20 August 1941. After approval they will be incorporated with the Fleet Plan as annexes as prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. Further annexes prepared by the Commander-in-Chief to cover operations to be undertaken in later phases of the war will be distributed when completed and approved.

[14] 5. Suitable binders for this Plan will be forwarded as soon as received by this command.

[s] H. E. Kimmel  
H. E. KIMMEL.

[15]  
Op-12B-2-djm  
(SC) A16/EF12 (FF12)  
Serial 098912 D-33956  
Secret

Sep 9 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: The U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow No. 5 (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow No. 5) WPPac-46, review and acceptance of.

Reference: (a) CinCPac Secret let. Serial 064W of 25 July, 1941.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations has reviewed subject Plan and accepts it.

2. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

H. R. STARK.

[16] 24 May 1941

Top Secret

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCPAC

Info: CINCLANT, COMDG GEN 2 MAR DIV, COMBASEFOR, COMTRANS-BASEFOR, COM 11

242130

A courier is being sent to commanding general of the Second Marine Division carrying orders for an organization of a reinforced regiment for duty with the First Marine Division X Direct HEYWOOD, FULLER, BIDDLE, MANLEY, LITTLE, McKEAN, STRINGHAM under appropriate transport commander to combat load this regiment at San Diego at earliest practicable date then proceed Canal Zone transit and report to CINCLANT for duty on arrival Cristobal X This movement is to be kept in the strictest secrecy X Advise what itinerary you plan to make.

[17] 15 May 1941

Top Secret

From: CINCPAC

Action: OPNAV

150625

Following are movements and compositions of task groups:

GEORGE 71: COMCRUDIV 8 in SAVANNAH and MISSISSIPPI; COMDES-DIV 15 in LANG, STERRETT, and WILSON; depart Hawaii 19 May arrive Canal Zone 2 June. (Refer your 132019)

GEORGE 72: COMBATDIV 3 in IDAHO and BROOKLYN; COMDESRON 8 in WINSLOW, WAINWRIGHT, and STACK; leave 20 May transit 4 June night.

GEORGE 73: NEW MEXICO and NASHVILLE; COMDES-DIV 17 in MORRIS, BUCK, and ROE; depart 20 May thru Canal June 6.



GEORGE 74; PHILADELPHIA leave this area 23 May; DESDIV 3 leave from SAN DIEGO 29 May; 30 May meet at sea arrive Taboga Island 8 June.

Forwarding OPORD copy. Can deliver to units concerned without use COM15 radio if info similar COM15 0513000 April is received by 18 May from OPNAV.

[18] 13 May 1941

Top Secret

From: OPNAV  
Action: CINCPAC  
132019

OPNAV Serial 6538 instructions modified as below:

Organize 3 groups each consisting of 1 battleship, 1 light cruiser, 3 DDS from units contained in that serial. Wish these groups to leave at intervals of 1 or 2 days. Fourth group to be composed of 1 light cruiser plus DESDIV 3, latter DDS to join cruiser at sea prior arrival Panama this group to follow third group through canal at 1 or 2 day interval. Utmost secrecy desired about the fact ships are leaving Hawaiian area or west coast for Atlantic X. Wish ships leaving Hawaii to go direct to Canal Zone and all groups transit at night. Advise as soon as possible composition of groups, proposed departure dates, and expected arrival dates at Canal Zone so arrangements for transit can be made by OPNAV. As soon as practicable initiate these movements. Small groups like YORKTOWN can apparently make transit without publicity.

[19] A16-1/  
ND14(01084)

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 17 October 1941.

Secret

From: Commandant, 14th Naval District

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Via: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subj: Re-appraisal of local defense forces of Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

Ref:

- (a) Com14 conf. ltr. to OpNav of 30 Dec. 1941, Ser. 629.
- (b) CINCUS conf. 1st end. to Com14 Ser. 629, CINC File A16(022) of 7 January 1941.
- (c) Com14 conf. ltr. to OpNav of 7 May 1941, Ser. 0430.
- (d) CinCPac secret ltr Ser. 038W of 20 May 1941 to OpNav.
- (e) Com14 conf. ltr. to OpNav of 31 Oct. 1940 Ser. 510.

1. All of the above references bear on the local defense forces and security measures of this area.

2. The only increment that has been made to these forces during the past year, exclusive of net vessels, is the U. S. S. SACRAMENTO which has no batteries, to speak of, with which the vessel can fight, and no speed with which she can run.

3. Although the writer of this letter is aware that the Department has been fully informed about the deficiencies in this District, he feels it necessary to again bring the subject to attention.

4. Recently, the Commandant endeavored to obtain, without much success, from the Commander-in-Chief the assignment of certain planes which could be used in connection with anti-submarine patrol. The only planes now available for this purpose are Army planes, and the types and numbers are inadequate for the purpose.

5. The only anti-submarine vessels now in the District are the four destroyers of Destroyer Division Eighty, one being still unequipped with listening gear, and three Coast Guard Cutters. These vessels will not only have to be used for hunting and tracking down submarines but will also be required for escort and security patrol in a very extensive front.

[20] 6. It is urged that the Department send a number of small, fast craft to this District equipped with listening gear and depth charges for this purpose. It is further urged that the Department send to this District at least two squadrons of VSO planes which can be used for patrol against enemy submarines.

7. Nearly all of the failures of the British have been caused by what may be expressed in the cliché "Too little and too late." It is hoped that we may profit from their errors.

C. C. BLOCH.



[21] ND14/(18)  
Serial 096W  
*Secret*

UNITED STATES FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship  
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

My

1st Endorsement to Com-14 secret ltr S-A16-1/ND14 (01084) of 17 October 1941.  
From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet  
To: Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subj: Re-appraisal of local defense forces, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

1. Forwarded.

2. There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the Department to furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District, with forces adequate to his needs may be predicated upon a conception that, in an emergency, vessels of the United States Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for these purposes. If such be the case, the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation. A fleet, tied to its base by diversion to other purposes, of light forces necessary for the security at sea, is, in a real sense no fleet at all. Moreover, this fleet has been assigned, in the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecution of which requires not only all the units now assigned, but as many more as can possibly be made available.

3. The necessities of the case clearly warrant extraordinary measures in meeting the Commandant's needs.

4. Transmission of this document within the continental limits of the United States by registered mail is authorized.

H. E. KIMMEL.

cc: Com-14

[22] C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14  
(629)  
*Confidential*

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT AND NAVY YARD,  
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 30 December 1940.

From: Commandant, 14th Naval District.  
To: Chief of Naval Operations.  
Via: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.  
Subj: Situation concerning the security of the Fleet and the present ability of the local defense forces to meet surprise attacks.

Ref:

- (a) OpNav dispatch 092135 of October 1940.
- (b) OpNav dispatch 182128 of October 1940.
- (c) CNO's personal ltr addressed to CINCUS dated 22 November 1940.
- (d) Com14 dispatch 150055 of October 1940.
- (e) Com14 dispatch 220230 of October 1940.

1. In view of the inquiry contained in reference (a), (b), and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the 14th Naval District to meet surprise hostile attack of an enemy with the equipment and forces at hand.

2. *Aircraft raids.*

Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be brought by carriers. Therefore, there are two ways of repelling attack. First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Second, by driving off attacking bombers with anti-aircraft guns and fighters. The Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distance reconnaissance with which to locate enemy carriers and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian area 59 B-18 bombers. All of these are classified as being obsolete. The model is six years old and the planes themselves are five years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers nor types are satisfactory for the purposes intended. New bombing types of planes are expected some time in the future. However, not before July 1941. For distance reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet.



To drive off bombing planes after they have been launched will require both fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns. The Army has in Hawaiian area, 36 pursuit planes, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of them are six years old and some of them are four years old. In numbers and models, there is a serious deficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40 is in production to the extent that the 185 projected for Hawaii can be delivered. This does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941; this number does not appear adequate.

[23] The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor Base by anti-aircraft guns. There are in Hawaii 26 fixed 3'' guns and 44 mobile 3'' guns. There are projected 24 more, to be delivered in 1941. There are no 37-mm and only 109-.50 caliber out of the projected 120 37-mm and 308-.50 caliber machine guns. The Army plans to place the greater part of the 3'' guns around Pearl Harbor and only a few near other main objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary to increase the numbers of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to have any semblance of anti-aircraft defense. Furthermore, I express my doubt as to the efficacy of a 3'' gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers. The Army made no plans for the anti-aircraft defenses of Lualualei or Kaneohe; furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of anti-aircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor or Honolulu in order that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited number of anti-aircraft barges afloat, I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian area. This number is in addition to 37-mm and .50 caliber machine guns.

In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning center which will consist of eight radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed and five are mobile. When completed at an indefinite date in the future, this warning net should be adequate.

### 3. DEFENSE AGAINST SUBMARINES.

The additional defense against submarines would be continued by patrol vessels and aircraft working in conjunction. The District has no aircraft for this purpose. Recently, there have arrived here three vessels of Destroyer Division Eighty which is assigned to the local defense forces. These vessels have listening gear and, when repaired and ready for service, will be a valuable contribution for anti-submarine and escort work. No anti-submarine nets are planned, nor are any considered desirable. Anti-torpedo nets are projected for the entrances of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. They will probably be delivered about 1 March 1941. The net depot will be completed somewhat later.

### 4. DEFENSE AGAINST MINES.

The District has recently built and equipped one sweeping barge and three tugs are being equipped for towing and energizing the coil. This barge can probably work out of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor until such time as it is seriously injured. The District has no vessels available for use as sweepers for anchored mines. A number of minesweepers are being built or purchased, but their delivery dates here are uncertain. A large number of sweepers will be required in order to keep the harbors of Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, and Kaneohe clear and, in addition, Hilo on Hawaii, Kahului and Lahaina on Maui, and Port Allen and Nawiliwili on Kauai. With the delivery of sweepers now being built or purchased, the general situation will be improved immeasurably.

### [24] 5. DEFENSE AGAINST BOMBARDMENT.

The coast defenses of the Army are considered adequate except that Kaneohe receives very little protection from the batteries.

### 6. SABOTAGE.

There are two tank farms, the upper and the lower. The lower is entirely contained in the Government reservation and, by the use of roving patrols, is considered reasonably secure. The upper farm is adjacent to a public highway. The farm is surrounded by an unclimbable fence and each tank has an earth berm. Its chief exposure is along the highway. To counteract this, three elevated sentry stations have been erected, each equipped with searchlights. This enables sentries to keep a continuous lookout over the entire fence line day and night; the upper farm is considered fairly secure.

### 7. WATER AND ELECTRIC SUPPLY.

Recently a guardhouse has been erected and an alarm has been made, the Marines alternating with the Army, for constant guard on the water supply.

A constant guard is kept on the electric supply lines through which outside power is received.



8. An elaborate system of photograph passes, search and examination is in effect. There are over 5,000 Civil Service employees who come into the yard each day. In addition, there are about 5,000 employees of civil contractors and several thousand enlisted men. In addition to the above, there is a constant stream of trucks and vehicles of all descriptions carrying supplies, stores, etc. It is impossible to maintain absolute security without disruption of the work of the yard. However, surprise searches and periodic stops, etc., are in effect in order that the alert may be emphasized. The main gate has been strengthened to prevent rush; there have been two drills for the purpose of giving surprise training to the yard garrison in the event of a surprise riot in the yard. In addition to the above, a survey has been made, not only of the yard, but of all the outlying stations, and every effort is being made to close holes and stop gaps. While the Commandant is not satisfied, he feels that the precautions taken are reasonably effective but that they are susceptible to improvement, which will be made as occasion warrants.

[25] 9. It should be borne in mind that until comparatively recently, none of us in this country had very much conception of what measures were necessary and what provisions were desirable in order to effect any measures of protection against aircraft, against submarines, against mines, and against subversive elements. The officers and men of this command have been alert, zealous, and vigilant in executing all measures under their control in order to properly prepare the District for any exigencies.

10. It should be assumed that the War Department is fully aware of the situation here and that it will proceed vigorously with a view to overcome deficiencies. It may be that they have failed to recognize the necessity for large numbers of anti-aircraft guns and pursuit planes. I suggest that the Chief of Naval Operations make inquiry from the War Department as to what their plans are and on what dates they predict that they will be accomplished and then, if the numbers and dates are not satisfactory, these features may be discussed at length.

11. It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view that the War Department should in any way come to believe that there is lack of agreement between the Army authorities and Navy authorities here, or that the officials of the 14th Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do something in regard to Army matters.

C. C. BLOCH.

[26] A16/  
Serial 022  
*Confidential*

UNITED STATES FLEET,  
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship,  
*Pearl Harbor, T. H., January 7, 1941.*

1st Endorsement to Com14 conf. ltr.

A16-1/A7-2/ND14 (629) of 30 Dec. 1940,

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Situation concerning the security of the Fleet and the present ability of  
of the local defense forces to meet surprise attacks.

1. Forwarded. The Commander-in-Chief has conferred with the Commandant, 14th Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. As a result of this conference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and an inspection in company with him, information was furnished on which the Commandant, 14th Naval District prepared the basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant, 14th Naval District in the opinion that the present Army pursuit squadrons and anti-aircraft batteries are adequate to protect the Fleet at Pearl Harbor against air attacks. When established, the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate. The proposed total of 68 mobile three-inch guns for this area is not considered adequate. With the almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area, a materially greater number of larger and longer range anti-aircraft guns are necessary to counter high altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.

2. If neither the increased anti-aircraft batteries nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an extended period, the defense of Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet



which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans for cooperation with the local defense forces are being made. At present, the continuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or anti-aircraft batteries is not contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present conditions does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant interrupting entirely the training required by fleet air units which would have to be largely curtailed if constant readiness with fighter squadrons were required.

[27] 3. There does not appear to be any practicable way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the harbor to protect the ships moored therein against torpedo plane attack without greatly limiting the activities within the harbor, particularly the movements of large ships and the landing and take-off of patrol squadrons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the only operating base available to the Fleet in this area, any passive defense measures that will further restrict the use of the base as such should be avoided. Considering this as an impossibility of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of an enemy being able to send a carrier sufficiently near in war time in the face of active fleet operations, it is not considered necessary to lay such nets.

4. The defense against submarines and mines are considered adequate under present peacetime conditions, but early installation of under-water sound-submarine detection system should be made. Also the delivery of the required ships to the 14th Naval District defense forces should be expedited, particularly ships for sweeping magnetic and anchored mines.

5. In this connection, is urgently recommended that local defense forces, adequate for the protection of Naval installations at Pearl Harbor and the Fleet units based thereon, be provided the Commandant, 14th Naval District. In order to provide freedom of action for the United States Fleet, and further, to avoid the necessity of detailing important fleet units (because no other ships are available) to tasks requiring only part of their full capabilities, it is considered that the forces provided should be sufficient for full protection and should be independent of the presence or absence of the ships of the United States Fleet. It is further considered that the provisions of adequate local defense forces for the 14th Naval District should be given high priority than continental Naval Districts, where both the possibility of, and objectives for, attack are much less.

J. O. RICHARDSON.

cc: Com-14

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,  
14TH NAVAL DISTRICT,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 7 May 1941.

[28] Via Clipper Mail

Confidential

From: Commandant, 14th Naval District,

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Local Defense Measures of Urgency.

1. A careful study indicates that the only way that submarines can be kept out of an area or destroyed is by the use of:

(a) Small fast seagoing vessels equipped with listing gear, depth charges and guns.

(b) Aircraft.

(c) A combination of (a) and (b).

(d) Mines.

2. In any Pacific war, it appears very obvious that the principal effort of our enemy will be to concentrate its submarine activity in the area outside and near Honolulu, Pearl Harbor, the Island Bases and the other ports of the Islands. The protection supplied by existing arrangements for this area, exclusive of the Fleet, is very weak and unsatisfactory.

3. At the present time, the District Commandant has four old destroyers only, and these vessels, in addition to the anti-submarine activities, also act as escorts and patrols in the Coastal Frontier; he has no aircraft and complete reliance has to be placed (exclusive of the Fleet) on Army planes. This necessarily requires much indoctrination of pilots and much training to qualify them for the recognition of various types of vessels and other matters-pertaining to the sea before they become proficient in spotting and attacking submarines.

4. At the Island Bases, harbors with some degree of security will be at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra, but it is thought that craft as indicated in subparagraph (a) of paragraph one of this letter will be required at these places.

5. This is particularly true at Wake where it will be a couple of years before



the harbor is dredged out. The quickest time ever made in unloading a ship at Wake is ten days. Imagine a vessel moored ten [29] days off Wake Island to transfer freight and provisions to the men working there and to the garrison. This would appear to the undersigned as being a submarine picnic. Accordingly, it is believed that at that place it will be necessary to have several of the craft indicated in paragraph 1 (a).

6. Summarizing, the object of this letter is to invite attention to the weakness of the local defense forces in protecting the vital communication lines at Oahu and the island bases and to recommend that every effort be made to supply this District at the earliest possible time with the necessary implements to combat the most probable form of attack.

(C) C. C. BLOCH.

cc: CinCPac.

[30] Attached thereto is a routine slip, CINCUS routing No. 04122, containing a number of unintelligible initialings and bearing the notation under the heading Remarks, "All too true".

[31] In reply refer to initials and No.  
Op-12B-7-dlm.  
(SC) A16-1/ND14.  
Ser. 0135412.  
Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,  
Washington, November 25, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and The Commandant, 14th Naval District.

Subj: Local defense forces, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

Ref.:

- (a) CinCPac secret ltr A16/(038W) of May 20, 1941 to CNO.
- (b) W. P. L.—46.
- (c) W. P. Pac—46.
- (d) CNO secret ltr Op-12B-7-djm, (SC) A16-1/ND14, Ser. 070312; of June 23, 1941, to CinCPac, copy to Com14.
- (e) Com14 secret ltr (SC) A16-1/ND14 (01084) of Oct. 17, 1941.
- (f) CinCPac end. ND14/16, Ser. 096W of no date, to ref. (a).
- (g) CNO conf. ltr. Op-22-A2, (SC) A16-3(9), Ser. 0115422 of Oct. 23, 1941.

1. The request of the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in reference (e), for a number of small anti-submarine craft and at least two squadrons of VSO planes for anti-submarine patrol, and the endorsement thereon by Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference (f), have been given full consideration by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. The previous letter of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference (a), pertaining to the same general subject, was replied to in reference (d).

3. The Chief of Naval Operations notes that the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in his War Plan, reference (c), has taken full cognizance of his responsibilities in connection with his tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. The forces available in the Hawaiian area, both fleet and local defense forces, in the actual operations of our own and hostile forces, will, of course, indicate the numbers of fleet vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local defense tasks.

[32] 4. Neither the *local defense forces operating plan*—Rainbow No. 5 (Naval District Plan 0-5, Rainbow No. 5) nor the *Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan*, both required by reference (b), have yet been received by the Chief of Naval Operations. The joint plan should indicate what assistance in anti-submarine or other patrols will be rendered by Army Air Forces. A recent joint letter of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, contained in reference (g), provided for joint exercises of Army and Navy Frontier forces and called attention to the necessity of early completion of both defense plans.

5. The augmentation of the local defense forces of the 14th Naval District is proceeding as fast as the availability of ships, funds, personnel, material, and priorities will permit. The current situation in this regard may be summarized as follows:

(a) The Department now has authority to acquire and convert four small and ten larger types of privately-owned vessels for the Naval local defense forces



of the 14th Naval District. These are generally of the yacht type and do not have very high speeds. The delivery of under-water detection devices is slow, but every effort will be made to give priority for such gear assigned to these vessels.

(b) The completion of the 173-ft. subchasers (PC) is progressing slowly, and they will not be turned out in any quantity until about May 1942. Eight of these, due for completion in May 1942, are *tentatively* assigned to the 14th Naval District. The date of completion of the 110-ft. subchasers (PC) is indefinite, due to the engine situation.

(c) The Commandant now has under his command, the Coast Guard of the 14th Naval District. Of the Coast Guard vessels under his command, the following are equipped with depth charges and under-water detection gear: TANEY, RELIANCE, and TIGER.

(d) Ten YMS's, expected to have depth charges and *sound gear when available*, are tentatively assigned to the 14th Naval District. Two of these are due for completion in the third quarter.

(e) The Department has no additional airplanes available for assignment to the 14th Naval District. Allocations of new aircraft squadrons which become available in the near future will be determined by the requirements of the strategic situation as it develops.

[33] 6. Transmission of this document by the following means is necessary and is authorized: within the continental limits of the United States by registered airmail; beyond the continental limits of the United States via P. A. A. locked box.

/S/ H. R. Stark  
H. R. STARK

Com14 told to comply with paragraph four, \* \* \* of 12/17/41.

[34] In reply refer to initial and No.

Op30C1-AJ

(SC) N20-12

Serial 09330

*Confidential*

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
Washington, February 15, 1941.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subj: Anti-Torpedo Baffles for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attacks, Pearl Harbor.

1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition, the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in planning the installations of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which the following may be considered:

(a) A minimum depth of water of 75' may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes, 150' of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250'. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height for drop is 60' or less. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

[35] (f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side more difficult.



(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of antiaircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship antiaircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of natural, well-protected anchorages within the harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation baffles would be difficult because of the congestion.

3. As a matter of interest, the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very low launching heights at reported range by the individual aviators of 400 to 1,300 yards from the battleships, but the *depths of water* in which the torpedoes were launched were *between fourteen and fifteen fathoms*. The attacks were made in the face of intensive and apparently erratic antiaircraft fire. The eastern shore line of the anchorage and moorings were protected by numerous balloon barrages, but there was no trawler balloon barrage to the west. The torpedoes were apparently dropped inside of the nets, probably A/T nets.

[36] 4. It is considered that certain large bays and harbors, where a fleet or large force of heavy ships may be anchored and exposed with a large body of water on an entire flank, should have that flank protected by a series of baffles if the water is deep enough for launching torpedoes there. The main fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow, for instance, has an A/T net extending slightly to the north of a line between Calf of Flotta and Cava Island, protecting the main fleet anchorage. The depth of water where this net is laid is approximately 17 fathoms. On the other hand, constructed harbors, in which practically all available space is taken up by anchorages, and which are relatively deep, probably must depend upon other defense measures. It might be possible and practicable to provide in some places, which are not protected by relatively shallow water, antitorpedo baffles practically surrounding a limited number of berths for large ships, such as battleships or carriers. An extreme example of this is furnished at the present time by the French at Dakar, where double nets surround the Richelieu; she is placed similarly as in a dry dock, and evidently would have to open a section of the net to be hauled clear. The depth of water at Dakar, however, is very shallow.

5. The present A/T nets are very expensive, extremely heavy, are heavily anchored and moored, take up about 200 yards of space perpendicular to the line of the net, take a long time to lay, and are designed to stand up under heavy weather conditions. There is apparently a great need for the development of a light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within protective harbors and which can be readily removed. It is hoped that some such net can be developed in the near future.

6. Recommendations and comments of the Commander in Chief are especially desired.

H. R. STARK.

cc: CinCLant  
CinCAsiatic

[37] Op30C1-AJ  
(SC)N20-12  
Ser. 010230  
Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
February 17, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commandant, First Naval District.

The Commandant, Third Naval District.

The Commandant, Fourth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.

The Commandant, Sixth Naval District.

The Commandant, Seventh Naval District.

The Commandant, Eighth Naval District.

The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.

The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.



The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.  
 The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District.  
 The Commandant, Naval Station, Guantanamo.

Subj: Antitorpedo Baffle for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attacks.

1. In previous correspondence, the Commandants and local joint planning committees have been requested, where considered necessary, to submit recommendations concerning the employment of nets and booms in their defenses. In nearly all cases the recommendations received were limited to harbor entrances. One of the reasons for this was that the Department, after previously making a study of many harbors, submitted certain proposals for consideration by the districts, but did not specifically propose any protection against torpedo plane attacks.

2. The Commandants and local joint planning committees are requested, if they have not already done so, to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning antitorpedo baffles, especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the Fleet in their respective harbors, and especially at the large fleet bases.

3. In considering the use of A/T baffles, the following limitations, among others, may be borne in mind:

[38] (a) A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.

(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.

(d) Room must be available inside the baffle for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes upon striking baffle.

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of antiaircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

(i) Availability of shore and ship antiaircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection.

(j) Availability of naturally well-protected anchorages within the harbor from torpedo plane attack on a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the establishment of certain baffles would be difficult because of congestion.

R. E. INGERSOLL,  
*Acting.*

cc: CinCPac  
 CinC Atlantic  
 CinC Asiatic

CO, NavNetDep, Tiburón BuOrd  
 CO, NavNetDep, Newport Od-12

[39] Op-30C1-AJ  
 (SC)M20-12  
 Serial 055730  
 Confidential

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
 Washington, June 13, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commandant, First Naval District  
 The Commandant, Third Naval District  
 The Commandant, Fourth Naval District  
 The Commandant, Fifth Naval District  
 The Commandant, Sixth Naval District  
 The Commandant, Seventh Naval District  
 The Commandant, Eighth Naval District  
 The Commandant, Tenth Naval District  
 The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District



The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District  
 The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District  
 The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District  
 The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District  
 The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District

Subj: Antitorpedo Baffles for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attack.

Ref: (a) CNO conf. ltr. Op-30C1 Ser. 010230 of Feb.17,1941.

1. In reference (a), the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning antitorpedo baffles, especially for protection of large and valuable units of the Fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major Fleet bases. In paragraph three were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles, among which the following was stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75' may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as 300', and in some cases may initiate dives of considerably less than 75', and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

[40] 3. While no minimum depth of water in which Naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attack force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information, the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto, were, in general, at thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched at eleven or twelve fathoms.

R. E. INGERSOLL.

cc: CinCPac; CinCLant; CinCAF; Co, NavNetDep, Tiburon; Co, NavNetDep, Newport; Comdt., NavSta Guantanamo; Comdt., NavSta Samoa; BuOrd; Op-12.

[41] 4 December 1941

Secret

From: CINCPAC

Action: COMTASKFOR 3 }  
 COMFOURTEEN } Mailgram  
 COMPATWING 2 }

Info: COMBATFOR }  
 COMBASEFOR } Mailgram  
 COMAIRBATFOR }  
 LEXINGTON }

ø40237

Myser ø1825 of 1ø Nov marine scoron two three one will base eighteen planes Midway X Lexington provide transportation X On 5 Dec after sortie Pearl form Task Force Twelve under COMCRUSCOFOR consisting of Lexington Chicago Astoria Portland Desron Five less DESDIV Ten X Task Force Twelve proceed by direct route to arrive four hundred miles 13ø degrees from Midway at 223ø GCT on 7 Dec X From that vicinity fly off Marine planes to Midway X Return operating area and resume normal operations after planes have arrived Midway X COMTASKFOR Nine direct patrol planes from Midway cover Lexington flying off position provide security while that area and guard Marine plane flight X Communications radio condition 19 guard continuously NPM primary fox X COM 14 inform Midway planes expected arrive about ø2øø GCT on 8 Dec and require Midway report arrival to Com 14 by coded dispatch X COM 14 pass this report to COMTASKFOR 12 X Midway submarine patrol will be advised.

[42] From: CNO

Action: CINCUS, CINCAF, COMROLFOR (Mailgram)

Date: 21 January 1941

212155

The international situation continues to deteriorate X It now appears to me that if war eventuates its general character will be according to plan DOG my



memorandum to the secretary X If this estimate proves correct I contemplate ordering mobilization according to plan RAINBOW Three with following modifications Atlantic Fleet principal concentration New England and Canada execute all tasks except affirm expect early reenforcement from Pacific and much stronger British Isles detachment X Pacific Fleet waiting attitude or execute assigned tasks in area eastward of 160 degrees east depending on action by Japan X Asiatic Fleet can not expect early reenforcement alert status or carry out tasks according to circumstances.

[43] From: Alusna, London  
Action: OPNAV

Top Secret

Date: 3 February 1941

03140 Passed to CINCUS CINCLANT CINCAF for info as OPNAV 032300

I have been officially informed that Japanese are apparently planning an offensive on a large scale presumed against Indochina Malay Peninsula or the Dutch East Indies no doubt to be coordinated with attack on Great Britain approximately February 10. It is definite that the Jap and German relations are becoming most intimate and that the Japs are conducting a hatred campaign against the British even in ordinarily pro-English press also two large Japanese Merchant vessel sailings have been cancelled. Reports believed reliable state that all Jap shipping being called home to be taken over by the government. Request your knowledge of this. The Japanese mediating that Indochina scene meeting aboard Jap cruiser. Price of umpire's services unreliably reported to be bases on the west coast of Siam that are usable by light craft for cutting Singapore communications via the Malacca Straits.

[44] CINCPAC FILE NO.

Sn

A4-3/FF12/(13)

Serial 01254

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., August 13, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander Battle Force (Commander Task Force ONE).

Commander Aircraft, Battle Force (Commander Task Force TWO).

Commander Scouting Force (Commander Task Force THREE).

Commander Base Force.

Commanding General, Second Marine Division.

Subject: Employment Schedules; U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942.

Reference:

(a) Cincus ltr. A4-3/FF1 Serial 1773 of 16 May, 1938.

(b) U. S. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 4CL-41.

(c) Cincpac Conf. ltr. A4-3/FF1-1 Serial 0750 of 8 May, 1941.

Enclosure (Under separate cover): (A) Copy of subject schedule—Action Addressees 10 each, information addressees 3 each.

1. Enclosure (A) has been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and is the general directive for preparation of the subject of this letter.

2. Second quarter employment schedules will be submitted for approval by 5 September, printed and distributed by 15 September, 1941, as follows:

(a) Task Force Commanders inform Type Commanders and Commander Base Force of the times in the schedule to be devoted to inter-type tactics in their respective Task Forces, as soon as practicable.

(b) Type Commanders submit two Task Force Commanders, information Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommendations for type training indicating priorities in exercises. Commander Scouting Force assign submarines and Patrol Squadrons to Task Forces.

[45] (c) Task Force Commanders and Commander Base Force prepare and submit to Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for approval, the quarterly employment schedule coordinating the requirements of types in their respective Forces.



3. Fleet units in Hawaiian Area are divided for training and operations between three Task Forces, Base Force, and Naval Transportation Service as follows:

*TASK FORCE ONE*—Commander Battle Force.

Batdivs TWO and FOUR  
SARATOGA and planes  
Crudiv NINE  
Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE  
Mindiv ONE, OGLALA  
 $\frac{1}{3}$  available submarines  
2 Patrol Squadrons

*TASK FORCE TWO*—Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.

Batdiv ONE  
ENTERPRISE and planes  
Crudivs THREE and FIVE  
Desflot TWO, Desdiv FIFTY  
Mindiv TWO  
 $\frac{1}{3}$  available submarines  
2 Patrol Squadrons

*TASK FORCE THREE*—Commander Scouting Force.

Crudivs FOUR AND SIX  
LEXINGTON and planes  
Desron FIVE plus Minron TWO  
Transports, Base Force (when present)  
Second Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment.  
Submarines, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet (to include Subdiv TWENTY-ONE) less  $\frac{2}{3}$  available submarines.  
Aircraft, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, less 4 Patrol Squadrons.  
[46] *BASE FORCE*, U. S. Pacific Fleet, less transports (when present).  
*NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE*—Vessels operating under Opnav and Com 14.

4. Units are assigned in accordance with reference (b). Units omitted from reference (b) have been included in the Task Force Organizations for training purposes.

5. Force and Type Commanders may, to suit individual ship requirements, shift units from one Task Force to another, maintaining proportion of upkeep and operating time.

6. One Task Force will be at sea at all times. When Task Forces enter and leave Pearl Harbor the same day, the departing force will clear before the entry of the other force commences.

7. Reference (c) remains effective, when practicable.

8. Schedules will provide for as many tenders and Base Force vessels as practicable to participate in Fleet Tactics during the period 21–25 November, 1941.

9. Operating and upkeep periods are assigned as follows:

	<i>Operating</i>	<i>Upkeep</i>
Task Force One-----		28 Sep-9 Oct
	10-18 Oct	19-31 Oct
	1-10 Nov	11-21 Nov
	22-28 Nov	29 Nov-12 Dec
	13-20 Dec	21-30 Dec
	31 Dec	
Task Force Two-----	24 Sept-2 Oct	3-17 Oct
	18-26 Oct	27 Oct-9 Nov
	10-17 Nov	18-27 Nov
	28 Nov-5 Dec	6-17 Dec
	18-26 Dec	27 Dec
[47] Task Force Three-----		20 Sep-1 Oct
	2-10 Oct	11-22 Oct
	23 Oct-1 Nov	2-16 Nov
	17-25 Nov	26 Nov-4 Dec
	5-13 Dec	14-25 Dec
	26-31 Dec	



10. Periods assigned for Fleet Tactics:  
 Task Forces Two and Three—23-26 Oct.  
 Task Forces One and Three—22-25 Nov.  
 Task Forces One and Two—18-20 Dec.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:	Comdesbatfor
Opnav	Comsubscofor
CincLant	Comairscofor
CincAF	Cominron TWO
Combatships	Compatwing TWO
Comerubatfor	Compatwing ONE
Cominbatfor	Com 14
Comeruscfofor	

P. C. Crosley,  
 /S/ P. C. CROSLY,  
 Flag Secretary.

[48] Date: 24 May 1941  
 From: OPNAV  
 To: CINCPAC  
 242150

Top Secret

The Department in the interest of morale will consider visits of small detachments or individual ships to the Pacific Coast. It is not desired that detachments of such size make these visits as to indicate the breaking up or reducing of Hawaiian concentration. Your recommendations are requested.

[49] Date: 17 Oct 1941  
 From: CINCPAC  
 To: COMSUBSCOFOR  
 Info to: COM 14  
 170354

Secret

When in all respects ready for war service send two submarines to Wake X Patrol radius fifteen miles of Wake X Direct submarines report contacts and be prepared take offensive action only if attacked or if ordered to do so by CINCPAC.

[50] Date: 17 Oct 1941  
 From: CINCPAC  
 To: COMSUBSCOFOR  
 Info to: COM FOURTEEN  
 170426

Secret

Direct submarines now operating Midway assume war patrol ten mile radius X Report contacts X Take offensive action only if attacked or if ordered to do so by CINCPAC.

[51] Date: 17 Oct 1941  
 From: CINCPAC  
 To: COMFOURTEEN  
 170319

Secret

Direct an alert status in outlying islands.

[52] Date: 17 OCT 1941  
 Originator: COM 14  
 Action: Naval Air Stations, Midway; Johnston; Palmyra; Marine Detachment at Wake.  
 Written up for CINCPAC Info  
 170356

Secret

In view international situation assume alert status.



[53] Date: 17 OCTOBER 1941  
 From: CINCPAC  
 To: COMPATWING 2 (TWO)  
 Info to: COMFOURTEEN  
 170429

Secret

When in all respects ready for war service send one squadron patrol planes to operate from Midway until further orders X Carry out daily patrol within 100 miles of island X Report contacts X In addition be prepared on further orders to send six of the above planes to Wake and replace them at Midway by six planes Form Pearl X Planes will take offensive action only if planes or bases are actually attacked or on further orders from CINCPAC.

[54] November 26 1941  
 From: Chief of Naval Operations  
 To: CINCPAC  
 270040

Secret

Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable X Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units X Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommended armament.

Copy to: War Plans Division, U. S. Army.

[55] 26 November 1941  
 From: Chief of Naval Operations  
 To: CINCPAC  
 270038

Secret

In order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station twenty-five Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable X It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an Aircraft Carrier X Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels X Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents X Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies X Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines X Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary X Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations X Confer with commanding general and advise as soon as practicable X

Copy to: War Plans Division, U. S. Army.

[Telegram]

[56] Standard Form No. 14A [Stamped] Secret.  
 Approved by The President March 10, 1926.  
 From War Department  
 Bureau A. G. O.  
 AG 381 (11-29-41) MC-E  
 EHB/cdm-1712  
 November 29 1941  
 Cablegram  
 COMMANDING GENERAL,

*Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.*

Sent No. 489, 11/29.

Consult C in C Pacific Fleet reference his dispatch number two eight zero six two seven to Chief of Naval Operations period In view of information contained in above dispatch comma the movement of the two Army Pursuit Squadrons as indicated in War Department cable number four six six comma November two



six comma one nine four one comma will be suspended period These squadrons should however be prepared to move on short notice period Paragraph War Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific advance bases from the Navy except for furnishing antiaircraft equipment period Consult C in C Pacific Fleet reference requirements and areas to be defended period War Department has also assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton period It is contemplated that you will form base defense units from the Hawaiian Garrison specially organized as task forces for particular areas period If these units are moved from Oahu comma necessary replacements from the United States will be furnished period Report your conclusions and recommendations to the War Department at the earliest practicable date.

ADAMS.

OFFICIAL: Secret.

/s/ (Illegible)  
Adjutant General.

47 AGO Dec 8 1941 Received

True copy:

Based on: WPD 4571-5, 11/29/41.

Green cy w/d & destroyed by  
burning. 12/30/41, CDM-1705

[Stamped] Secret.

[57] Nov. 28, 1941

Top Secret

From: CINCPAC

To: OPNAV

Action: 12

28 Ø 627

Reference Urdis 270040 and 270038; Wright now at Wake to discharge ground crews and material to operate one squadron of marine planes. It proceeds afterwards to Midway to land similar items. Arrangements have already been made to send each of those places essential ground material for temporary operation of 12 B-17 Army bombers, to leave Pearl about Dec. 1st, but at present only 6 such planes of the 12 on Oahu are in operating condition. An acute shortage of Army bombs precludes any shipments to outlying bases but Navy bombs are now available there. These may be used by the Army with minor alterations. Usefulness of Army pursuit planes for insular defense is radically limited by their doubtful capability of operating over 20 miles offshore. Their use is possible but inability to land on carrier freezes them to island where landed, and flexibility dispositions is thereby curtailed. Additional antiaircraft guns needed this area for Army & Marine defense battalions. Consider use of Army troop reinforcements for outlying bases inadvisable as long as Marines are available but plans are being made for such use of Army troops. All outlying forces must be exclusively under Navy command, 12 marine fighters leave Nov. 28 in carrier for Wake. Expect send other Marine planes to Midway later. On Dec. 1st sending 12 patrol planes to Wake from Midway, and replacing those at Midway from Pearl. The feasibility and advisability of relieving Marine planes with Army pursuits will be investigated more thoroughly.

[58] EG61/(16)

Serial 0114W

Secret

My

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 2 December 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operation.

Subject: Defense of Outlying Bases.

Reference:

- (a) Opnav despatch 270038 of November 1941.
- (b) Opnav despatch 270040 of November 1941.
- (c) Cincpac despatch 280627 of November 1941.
- (d) Opnav despatch 282054 of November 1941.
- (e) War Dept. despatch 48 of Nov. 29, 1941.
- (f) Cincpac secret serial 0113W of Dec. 3, 1941.
- (g) Cincpac secret serial 090W of Oct. 21, 1941.



1. Reference (a) advised that Army pursuit planes, could be made available for Wake and Midway in order to retain 2d Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use. Reference (b) advised that Army could make infantry available to *reenforce* defense battalions now on station, and that Army proposed to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, *might occupy* but that they could provide no anti-aircraft units.

2. Reference (c) outlined certain measures that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had already taken to strengthen the air defenses of Midway and Wake and others, including Army air cooperation, that were in progress. Reference (d) approved of the arrangements made and stated that the War Department would instruct the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in *support* of Marines. It also asked for report on present defenses of outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future. The report is furnished in reference (f).

3. Reference (e) from the War Department to the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, which referred to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's 280627, is somewhat at variance with Chief of Naval Operation despatches in that it states the War Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific advance bases from the Navy except for furnishing AA equipment. It also stated that the War Department has assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton Islands.

[59] 4. Reference (g) contained a study by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of the defenses of outlying bases and recommendations as to personnel and equipment therefor.

5. It is not completely clear whether or not the Navy Department has in mind that the Army will ultimately relieve the Marine Defense Battalions. If so, it is assumed that such action would be taken in order to have those battalions and their equipment available to garrison positions taken by assault in the Marshalls and the Carolines. Should such assumption be correct, it is pertinent to note that transports, *trained* assault troops, etc., are not now available to make the seizures. Moreover, the local Army authorities are not only short of anti-aircraft equipment, but of most other armament necessary for defense of an advanced island base. If the Marine Defense Battalions were withdrawn at this time it would be necessary to leave behind most of their equipment, and they would have none for use elsewhere.

6. To clarify the current situation to some extent, certain information and considerations that may not otherwise be readily available in the Department are mentioned below:

(a) Army is not only lacking AA guns for outlying bases, but has a serious shortage on Oahu. It has insufficient suitable guns for replacing Marine 7" and 5" guns without weakening the defenses of Hawaii. By taking 155 mm guns from Hawaii the Marine 5" guns might be replaced but the 155 mm guns would either cover a limited arc or else their mobility would be lost.

(b) Army can spare no .50 caliber machine guns but can supply rifles and .30 caliber machine guns.

(c) Army has a limited number of 37 mm guns, badly needed for defenses in Hawaii, but some few might be made available by weakening the defenses here; particularly as a considerable increase in the number of such guns is expected in the near future. At present there is a marked shortage of ammunition for 37 mm.

[60] (d) (1) Army pursuit planes are available in sufficient numbers to send at least one squadron each to Midway and Wake.

(2) The fighting capabilities of those planes is superior to that of Marine fighters or light bombers.

(3) They have no offensive capabilities against hostile surface craft or submarines.

(4) They lack navigational equipment, their personnel are inexperienced in flying over water and are much averse to operations more than fifteen miles from land.

(5) Pursuit planes once having landed at Midway or Wake, cannot fly off to carriers. It would be virtually impossible to take them out of Wake; and a very slow and difficult undertaking to remove them from Midway.

(e) Army has personnel available in sufficient numbers to reenforce or relieve the Marine Defense Battalions. The Marines have been organized, equipped, and trained for work of this particular character. They are already established, habited to the mode of life, and experienced in fitting their activities to accord



with the various other naval activities in these outlying places. It is no reflection upon the Army to say that their units would require considerable time to acquire the proficiency in this specialized work that the Marines already have.

(f) In emergency, Army personnel might replace casualties or reenforce Marines, but it would, for very obvious reasons, be highly preferable to have other Marines available for that purpose.

(g) No spare armament for defense battalions is available. In fact, some deficiencies in equipment for existing battalions exist; and the recommendations of reference (g) as to armament for the outlying bases have not been completely filled. Armament and equipment for any new defense battalions have not been assembled.

[61] (h) The bases are being developed to facilitate fleet operations. Irrespective of the source of defense forces, various other naval activities will continue at these outlying bases. Placing the defenses in Army hands would bring some difficult problems of command relationships. Such problems would not, of course, be insurmountable, but they would be avoided if the Marines are not replaced.

(i) Twelve Marine fighting planes are now on Wake: a squadron of Marine light bombers is in readiness to fly to Midway. These planes are accustomed to long operations over water, and from carriers. The bombers have offensive power against surface ships or submarines.

(j) Arrangements exist or will shortly exist on both Midway and Wake for temporary offensive operations of Army B-17 bombers, using Navy bombs. Only six such bombers on Oahu are now in operating condition.

(k) Personnel and equipment, up to the limits given in reference (g), are being transferred to the outlying bases as rapidly as available and the conditions at those bases make feasible.

(l) Prior to receipt of reference dispatches, arrangements for Army cooperation in certain respects had been made; and close cooperation and liaison will continue.

(m) Essential work is being pushed at outlying bases, and it is not intended to withdraw civilian workers if hostilities develop. Plans have been made to incorporate such workers into the defense organization insofar as practicable.

7. From the foregoing, it is concluded that at this time:

(a) Marine armament can be withdrawn from outlying islands to a very limited extent.

[62] (b) If the Marines are replaced, the personnel relieved, lacking equipment, will be valueless as a defense battalion.

(c) Replacing the Marines will very materially weaken the defenses because of less proficient personnel.

(d) Considering all aspects of the matter, Marine planes are more valuable in the Advance Bases than Army pursuit planes.

8. The presence of Army forces on outlying bases will inevitably bring up the question of command. Midway, Wake, Johnston and Palmyra are Naval Air Stations, designed and built primarily to support Fleet operations. Any other activities there, including defense, must be subordinate to this purpose. Defense itself exists solely for the purpose of insuring the availability of the bases. The establishments are small and close coordination of all activities is mandatory, extending to joint use of material and equipment and even to joint participation by all hands in unusual tasks. This can be accomplished only by unity of command, which must be vested in the one officer qualified to insure that the base fulfills its purpose, whether under attack or not and no matter what organization operates the defenses. The interests of the Navy are paramount and unity of command must be vested in the Commanding Officer of the Station. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as already brought out in his despatches, cannot too strongly emphasize this point.

9. The Commander-in-Chief recognizes that unforeseen events may rapidly develop that would necessitate replacement of Marines by Army personnel, provided suitable equipment is available. He has had conferences with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, on the matter and arrangements are in progress looking toward

(a) Organization of three Army defense battalions of approximately 800 men each (organization along the lines of Marine Defense Battalions):

[63] (b) Training of such units with equipment, Army or Marine, available on Oahu;

(c) Army steps to obtain requisite armament comparable to that called for in reference (g) for use in the Advance Bases;



(d) Army organization of three 18-plane pursuit squadrons to be kept in expeditionary status with crews, ground crews and equipment ready for transportation, on short notice, to Advanced Bases—planes to be transported by aircraft carrier and flown off near destination.

(e) Bringing aforementioned units to a satisfactory state of readiness and keeping them available for (1) relieving, supporting, or furnishing replacements for Marine Defense Battalions, or (2) for garrisoning other islands or developments not now manned by Marines.

10. In connection with this whole question, the major point for the moment appears to be that the Advanced Bases we now have are, to a greater or lesser extent, going concerns. Their development and provisions for defense have been evolved after much work and study. The international situation is such that active defense against hostile forces may be required on extremely short notice. Any radical change in the defense arrangements should be made only if their is compelling necessity therefor; and a definite indication of clear cut gain for over all operations.

11. The Commander-in-Chief is not aware of the particular circumstances which have opened up the questions under discussion. If additional Advanced Bases in our own or friendly territory are contemplated, it is highly important that further information on the subject be furnished the Commander-in-Chief.

12. If, during the progress of the war, enemy positions are taken and require garrisons they should, of course, be defended by Marine Defense Battalions. It would be preferable to have Marine battalions with full equipment available for such duty without disrupting the defenses of existing bases. At present, our Advanced Bases should be defended by the most competent personnel available, viz, the Marine Defense Battalions. [64] If our progress in the war has brought more advanced positions under our control, then the most seasoned and experienced personnel should be in the more exposed positions; and the present Advanced Bases which, by virtue of our forward movement, would be less liable to enemy attack, could be manned by less skilled personnel. Even so, it would be better to have new Marines rather than the Army take over their defense, but the Army should be ready and qualified to do so. In any event, the battalions projected into the new bases must have their full equipment without withdrawing that in the present bases.

13. The foregoing discussion has had particular application to Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra. The situation as to Samoa is not greatly different. Construction of Army airfields at Canton and Christmas Islands has brought those places into the picture. The Commander-in-Chief has felt that some defense at Canton should be provided at once against an enemy raider. As the Army has no suitable guns available for the purpose, he has arranged to send two five inch guns with fire control equipment from the Fourth Defense Battalion to meet temporarily the existing situation, pending clarification of the Department's policy regarding Canton. These guns will be manned by Army personnel.

14. Meantime, the Commander-in-Chief is making a study as to minimum requirements for the defenses of Canton. This will be forwarded separately within the next few days. The defenses contemplated will call for not more than two or three batteries of three inch AA guns, not more than two batteries of five inch guns and a limited number of smaller weapons. It is expected that not more than 300 men will be required for manning the defensive armament. It is probable that the requirements for Christmas would be less rather than more than that for Canton.

15. In view of the Commanding General's information that the War Department had assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton Islands, no steps have been taken toward defending Christmas, and agreement has been made locally with Army authorities that Marine equipment now going to Canton would be replaced as soon as possible.

[65] 16. It seems appropriate to express the growing concern of the Commander-in-Chief over the increase in number of Army and Navy stations that may require support from the Fleet. Such support may involve logistics, keeping open lines of communications, or active defense. Establishments at Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Samoa are already well advanced. Our Army is now engaged in building air fields at Christmas, Canton, Fiji, and New Caledonia, and consideration is being given to other installations in the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands. In addition, discussion has been made from time to time over the establishment of American bases in the Gilberts, Bismarck Archipelago, and other places.



17. Whether or not the Navy is initially concerned in the building or logistics or defense installations of these far flung establishments, it inevitably will become involved with them if war develops. Such involvement may seriously interfere with offensive operations of the Fleet. It can not be too strongly emphasized that new development of this nature must be curtailed, and only those permitted that will definitely contribute toward success in the Western Pacific. A Fleet in being behind a series of defensive positions in the Central and South Pacific can not contribute very much toward victory over a power some thousands of miles to the westward.

18. To summarize: the Commander-in-Chief considers that the current setup in the existing bases is in accordance with long and well considered plans that should not now be changed. He intends to:

(a) Continue the Marine Defense Battalions at Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra;

(b) Continue use of Marine planes at such of those places as circumstances require;

(c) Transfer a battery of five inch guns to the Army for use by Army personnel at Canton until the Army can obtain suitable replacement;

[66] (d) Continue cooperation and liaison with local Army authorities to develop and maintain in readiness Army units and equipment that may, on short notice, reenforce or relieve Marines at aforementioned bases in whole or in part.

19. It is recommended that:

(a) Deficiencies in armament at existing Advance Bases, and in existing Marine Defense Battalions, be remedied as rapidly as possible (see reference (g)):

(b) Fourth Defense Battalion and proposed new Defense Battalion be maintained as mobile battalions in Pearl Harbor in accordance with existing plans; and that the organization and acquirement of equipment for this new additional battalion be expedited;

(c) At least two additional defense battalions be organized and equipped at San Diego, with plans to use these battalions and those mentioned in (b) above for garrisoning positions captured in the Marshalls;

(d) An understanding with Army be reached now that in case Army takes over defense of Advance Bases, command of such bases will remain in the Navy (see paragraph 8);

(e) Commitments to further island developments in the Central and South Pacific be held to a minimum as to number and logistic requirements;

(f) No plans be made for relieving Marine Defense Battalions or air units until Army has organized, equipped and trained for coordinated action suitable units for taking over.

20. Transmission via U. S. Registered air mail is hereby authorized.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:

C. G., Haw. Dept.

Com 14

[67] Date: 1 December 1941

From: Opnav

To: CinCaf

Com Sixteen

Information: CincPac: Com Fourteen

Top Secret-Ultra

Ø114ØØ

Ambassador Tsubokami in Bangkok on twenty ninth sent to Tokyo as number eight seven two the following quote conferences now in progress in Bangkok considering plans aimed at forcing British to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singora as counter move to Japanese landing at Kota Bharu X Since Thai intends to consider first invador as her enemy comma Orange believes this landing in Malay would force British to invade Thai at Padang Bessa X Thai would then declare war and request Orange help X This plan appears to have approval of Thai Chief of Staff Bijitto XX Thai Government circles have been sharply divided between proBritish and proOrange until twenty five November but now Wanitto and Shin who favor joint military action with Orange have silenced anti Orange group and intend to force Premier Pibul to make a decision X Early and favorable developments are possible unquote



[68] Date: 28 November 1941  
 From: Opnav  
 Action: CinCaf  
 Information: CincPac; Com 14; Com 16  
 281633

Confidential  
 Top Secret

Following from State Department: Saigon—November 26—5 days ago Orange troop and supply vessels began to put in at Saigon taking up all available quay space, about 20,000 troops have landed and 10,000 arrived from the north by rail during same period. Troops in south Indo-China total about 70,000. Some estimate 128,000 but this is yet too high. Many trucks landed moving troops and supplies to interior. This movement which is of large proportions indicates hostilities against Thailand may soon begin. Hanoi—November 26—supplies and military equipment particularly railway, rolling stock, gasoline, landing at Paiphong even recently augmented and are being transshipped south. Among recently landed artillery are anti-tank guns. Japanese have recently purchased considerable number native boats along coast Tongking province. Reported they desire purchase 500. These boats are being sent south, Hanoi—November 26—American consul received reliable information governor general has ascertained from agent that around December 1 without either declaration of war or ultimatum Nippon navy will attack Isthmus Kra. Simultaneously army will advance on Thailand. Great increased troop landings and movements south during last few days about 4000 men landed. On November 25 and 26 1500 will go south by special train. In Tongking there are approximately 25,000 Orange troops and at Gialam around 90 airplanes. Hanoi—November 26—Early on November 25 all interested persons advised by Haiphong mayor that Japanese intended sequester all freight en route to China. Nips had demanded keys to all bonded warehouses by noon November 25. Mayor added [69] protest had been lodged by French officials but individuals effected by demand must use own judgment whether or not to comply.

[70] Dec. 6, 1941

Secret

From: CINCAF

To: OPNAV

Action: 38W

Ø61255

Copies: 12; 13; 16; 38; 388; Nayaide; CNO; 2Ø OP.

Report by Cinc China "25 ship convoy with escort of 6 cruisers and 1Ø DD's lat Ø8-ØØ N, 1Ø6-ØØ east at Ø316 GMT today. Convoy of 1Ø ships with two cruisers and 1Ø destroyers Ø7-4Ø north, 1Ø6-2Ø east two hours later. All on course west. Three additional ships Ø7-51 north 1Ø5 east at Ø442, course 31Ø. This indicates all forces will make for Kontron"

Sighted by my scouting force anchored Camranh Bay—3Ø ships and one large cruiser.

Info: CINCPAC; COM 16; COM 14

[71] 8 December 1941

Secret

From: ComSixteen

To: OpNav

Information: CincPac; CinAF; ComFourteen

Ø8Ø333

The following Japanese distributions are based upon radio call recoveriest since December first and are conservative: There is a heavy concentration of aircraft at Taiwan at the Kaki, Takao, and Taichu Airstations. South China Airforceheadquarters is now in the Saigon area with at least four groups of planes. Strength unknown. Eight Maru Airtenders in South China area estimated distribution as follows: At Takao five, at Saigon one and two at Sama. Intercepts of large volume of high precedence traffic from air activities in Saigon area indicate that extensive operations may be imminent. Radio bearings indicate that Akagi is moving south from Empire and is now in Nansei Islands area.



[72] Secret

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

5 JANUARY 1942.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSION

In accordance with the Commission's verbal directive, the following Summary is respectfully submitted:

In summarizing the frequency of occurrence of the periods when information was lacking in regard to the location or activity of a group, type or unit of the Japanese Fleet during the last six months of 1941, necessitates a general review of the procedures and methods followed:

1. Due to the distances involved, it is seldom possible to intercept the original direct transmissions from Japanese Fleet units at sea, consequently interception depends on those naval communications handled by the more powerful shore stations on broadcast schedules. Approximately 90% of the intercepted traffic is of this latter nature. A unit may be addressed by other units via direct communication or the ship-shore channels (rebroadcast) whether in port or at sea. During tactical exercises ORANGE utilizes medium and low frequencies which are inaudible here. During such periods it is necessary to rely on the intercept activities at Guam and Cavite to observe and report on these activities. When in port, a unit almost invariably shifts to the low-frequency, low-power, limited range, "harbor frequency" depriving all intercept stations of originated traffic. Thus occurs periods when little definite information is available relative to a unit's activities except that inferred from the traffic addressed it either by the routing or association with other units addressed or associations with the originator.

2. Changes of call signs, addresses, use of alternate, secret, tactical, and special calls, greatly complicates the identification of units and the reconstruction of the naval organization afloat and ashore. The Japanese Navy shifted its call signs on 1 May, 1 November and 1 December, 1941. Shortly after the 1 November change the Japanese begun using a "blanket broadcast" system in which no originator or addressee appeared, these being presumably buried in the cipher text.

3. It has been a general rule that when a unit was not heard originating traffic or using tactical circuits it was presumed to be in port or in a navy yard in a relatively inactive status.

4. It is to be noted that for the above reasons the *simultaneous* location of *each* Division of Battleships, cruisers, destroyers, carriers, or [73] submarines is not possible. Therefore, the locations of Fleet Flagships and some subordinate units of the above types must be relied upon to establish the presumed locations or activity of the remainder of the related lower echelons.

5. During the past six months, Fleet Intelligence records show that the occasions when uncertainty existed as to the exact location of certain types were:

Type	Total days uncertain	Number of periods	Range of periods
Battleships.....	70.....	Seven.....	8-14 days.
Cruisers (1st Fleet).....	Nearly all.....	Almost continual absence of positive indications.	
Cruisers (2nd Fleet, less CRUDIV 7).....	113.....	Eight.....	10-20 days.
CRUDIV 7 (very active on detached duty).....	63.....	Six.....	8-16 days.
Destroyers.....	Very indefinite..	Seven.....	9-33 days.
Carriers.....	84.....	Eight.....	8-22 days.
(If Cardiv 2, formerly very active on detached duty, be excepted from this analysis the following result is more typical.)			
Carriers (less Cardiv 2).....	134.....	Twelve...	9-22 days.
(In both cases the longest period, 22 days, was in July 1941.)			



Respectfully submitted,

EDWIN THOMAS LAYTON,  
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,  
Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Certified to be a True Copy :

/s/ J. M. LEE,  
Comdr., U. S. Navy,  
Flag Secretary, Staff, CINCPAC-CINCPAA.

[74] 28 Nov 1941  
From: CINCPAC  
To: COMPATWING 2  
Info: COMSCOFOR  
COMBATFOR  
COM 14  
COMBASEFOR  
COMAIRBATFOR

Secret

280450

Direct 12 patrol planes now at Midway proceed Wake on 1 Dec search en-route X Provide one squadron relieve Midway planes on 30 November X After arrival both squadrons direct them comply my 280447 X Present intention return Wake squadron Pearl about 5 December.

[75] 11/30/41  
ORIGINATOR CTF 9

Action: COMPATRONS 21, 22; COMTASKGROUP 9.2  
Information: CINCPAC; COM 14; COMSUBSCOFOR; CO NAS Midway; CO NAS Wake 292103

Operation order 9S1 X Information CINCPAC 280447 and 280450 X Task Force 8 ENTERPRISE, CHESTER, NORTHAMPTON, SALT LAKE CITY, 6 DD transporting Marine FigRon which will base on Wake X Planes will be launched 200 miles bearing 070 from Wake at 2000 GCT on December 3 X Enroute and returning Task Force 8 will pass point 400 miles south of Midway X Departed Pearl forenoon 28 Nov. X WRIGHT expected arrive Midway from Wake 3 December X Mission cover route and provide security for TF 8 while in vicinity of Wake in order to obtain information possible enemy forces in threatening position and provide readily available aerial striking power during period carrier will be launching Marine planes X Tasks PatRon 21 search as indicated: Nov. 30 depart Pearl daylight search sector 260-280 degrees to longitude 165 degrees thence on track 270 to long 172-30 thence to Midway; Dec 1 sector 170 dash 224 to 500 miles using 8 planes; Dec 2 sector 200-237 to 525 miles using four planes; Dec 3 sector 206-248 to 525 miles using 6 planes; Dec 4 sector 170-224 to 500 miles using 8 planes Dec 5 sector 126-168 to 525 miles using 6 planes X PatRon 22 Search as indicated; Dec 1 depart Midway daylight using 2 plane sections sector 226-249 to 525 miles thence on track 238 to far perimeter of 120 mile circle from Wake thence to Wake; Dec. 2 sector 060-102 to 525 miles using 6 planes; Dec 3 take off at 1800 GCT sector 048-092 to 500 miles using six planes; one plane be 200 miles bearing [76] 070 from Wake at 2000 GCT remain with Task Force 8 until 2400 GCT unless otherwise directed by visual remaining 5 planes each load with 2 500 pound bombs; unless otherwise directed unload bombs at 0230 GCT December 4 X On December four X On Dec 4 take off daylight for Midway X On December five take off at daylight for Pearl XRAY critical period entire operation forenoon 3 Dec. X Logistics fuel as required X Special provisions use Zone 0 times X Task Force 9 Basic Communications and Aerological Plans X Frequency Plan FOX COMTASKFOR 9 with FAIRDET at NAS Pearl X Maintain radio silence except for contact reports and emergencies X Arrange for bases to broadcast MO's on schedule without request X.



[77]

## UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

A2-11/FF12

A4-1/VZ

A3/VZ (95)

Serial 59

c/o FLEET POST OFFICE,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., January 7, 1942.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Airplane Situation, Hawaiian Area.

Reference:

- (a) ComAirScoFor Conf. Ltr. Serial 0755 of December 18, 1941, addressed to OpNav.
- (b) ComAirScoFor Conf. Ltr. Serial 0767 of December 24, 1941, addressed to Buairo.
- (c) CincCPAC desp. 041001 of January 1942.
- (d) CincCPAC desp. 050547 of January 1942.

Enclosure: (A) ComPatWing TWO Secret Ltr. Serial 0033 of December 30, 1941

1. In recent despatches, references (c) and (d), the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, pointed out the vital need for improvement of the aircraft situation in the Hawaiian area. This letter is written in amplification.

2. The following factors must form the basis for any consideration of aircraft requirements here:

(a) *The attack of 7 December will be followed by others.* The enemy has exploited the element of surprise. He can however, use it again, although to a lesser extent because of local alertness measures, if adequate search is not maintained. In any case, his strength in carriers and heavy ships is such that he need not depend on surprise. His objectives in the first assault were aircraft and ships. There remain untouched the very important and tempting objectives of fuel supply, navy yard industrial establishment and drydocks, commerial docks and the city of Honolulu. There remains, further, as an ultimate objective the taking of the island of Oahu itself, retention of which is by no means assured with the forces now available to us.

(b) *Japanese aircraft carrier aviation, with all due allowance for the advantage of surprise, proved itself on 7 December to be in a very high state of development.* This applies with full force not only to material and to the training, skill and determination of personnel, but also to the unquestionably brilliant manner in which the entire expedition was conceived, [78] planned and handled. This arm of the Japanese fleet has been greatly underestimated. Its potentialities must be recognized from now on.

(c) *Aircraft for Hawaiian defense must comprise adequate forces for long range search, for striking and for local interception.* All of these are vital for effective defense. None of these can be effective if any of the three is inadequate. It must be assumed that the Japanese will continue to have excellent intelligence reports of our activities here. An organization as perfect as that which provided complete information for every minute detail of the first attack cannot safely be assumed to have been eliminated. It follows that inability to maintain an effective search can hardly fail greatly to increase the probability of renewed attack.

3. The objectives of long range search are to make it possible to strike any enemy force before it can strike Oahu and to give ample advance warning of any such attempt. Provision for the first of these objectives covers the second. As will readily be seen by simple mathematical analysis (see enclosure (A)), the search should extend out to about 800 miles before planes turn homeward each day in order to:

(a) Make it possible to reach the enemy with an air striking force during daylight on the day he is discovered, and

(b) Prevent the enemy, if undiscovered on the previous day, from reaching a position close enough for launching aircraft before the succeeding day's search has reached him.

4. Search requirements are based on the following assumptions:

(a) *Carrier aircraft may be launched 300 miles from Oahu.* There is definite evidence that carrier aircraft were launched and recovered on 7 December 225 and 300 miles respectively from Oahu. These launching and recovery points can be interchanged without increasing the demand on Japanese aircraft endurance



that has already been met. It is possible that even greater ranges might be used by substitution of bombs for torpedoes and with retention near enemy carriers of shorter range types for their local defense.

(b) *Carrier speed for the run-in may be 27 knots.* This speed is not unreasonable and is believed to have been used on 7 December. The enemy can accept the logistic problem in fuel, for he did so.

[79] (c) *It cannot be assumed that any direction of approach may safely be left unguarded.* The fuel problem is no deterrent, for the approach was made from the north on 7 December. Increase in difficulty of the logistic problem would not be proportionately great if even an approach from the east were attempted. At the same time, as discussed above, neglect of any sector is apt soon to be known.

(d) *Air Search visibility is 25 miles.* That is, aircraft during the majority of the search are 50 miles apart, although they are closer together than this from departure until they are 300 miles out. This visibility assumption is obviously optimistic, particularly since clear weather will seldom extend over the entire search area. It is, however, the best (and the most) that can be done with aircraft available unless very large areas are to be entirely neglected. Although each succeeding day's search tends to disclose, at closer range, what might have been missed on the previous day, the long range search should be far more positive than is now possible.

5. The upshot of the foregoing assumptions, *which include perfect visibility*, is that about 50 planes (the number varying slightly with type) are needed daily for search. This number cannot be reduced, as suggested in the enclosure, if and when *reliable* radar equipment for airplanes is *available*, for this equipment will merely serve to counter the effect of poor visibility. Actually, toward meeting at present the minimum requirement of 50 per day, the situation is as follows: With departure of Patrol Squadron Twenty-two for the Asiatic theater and with completion of the current transfer here of three squadrons from the mainland, the number of patrol planes here becomes 67, with 4 of these under repair for at least a month. The number of Army heavy bombers (B-17's) here is 42, with 2 additional expected later. (Note that paragraph 2 of the enclosure is not up to date on these patrol plane and Army bomber figures.) This leaves a total on hand of 109 long range planes.

6. With these it is not possible simultaneously and effectively to maintain necessary long range search operations, to keep available a useful air striking force and to meet constant requirements for special missions, such as covering submarine contacts and guarding convoy approach and departure, without having on hand for search alone at least three times [80] the number of planes that are needed for search on any given day. There is no way of getting around this if material and personnel are to maintain the pace. Neither one nor the other can do more.

7. Search actually being made has had to be reduced to the following basis:

(a) The radius for the long range planes is 700 miles. Neither patrol planes nor B-17's can go farther, with reasonable margin for safe return, while carrying any bombs.

(b) 25 patrol planes and 12 Army Z-17's are being used daily for search (18 B-17's are being held continuously ready as a minimum striking force). The long range searching planes cover total sectors of about 290 degrees. Such relatively ineffectual planes (VSO, VJ and Army B-18's) as are available are used to cover remaining sectors totalling about 70 degrees to distances of 200 or 300 miles.

8. These figures vary somewhat from day to day, but the overall result is that only *four-fifths* of the circle is being covered to a reasonable range, and this with mediocre effectiveness, although available material and personnel are being strained to the limit. Furthermore, the remaining fifth is being covered very poorly, to short and inconclusive ranges. Still further, this essential expenditure of effort leaves no patrol planes available for support of task forces on special missions and none for our outlying island bases, beyond the two each that are now being maintained on an exchange basis at Johnston and Palmyra.

9. To improve the situation outlined above, which is not only critical but dangerous, there should be earliest possible action toward increasing the patrol wings in the Hawaiian area to at least twelve 12-plane squadrons of long range planes. Commander Patrol Wing Two in enclosure (A), and Commander Scouting Force in references (a) and (b), make entirely clear the very great advantages of naval use of long range land planes where this is practicable. The patrol wing increase to twelve squadrons should include the provision that at least one-



half of these planes be of the B-24 type. This is essential not only because of their superior characteristics but also because, otherwise, the limited seaplane operating potentialities of this area would be too crowded for war conditions.

[81] 10. It is realized that this expansion cannot be accomplished immediately. Nevertheless, the necessary machinery therefor should be set in motion now at highest priority. Meanwhile, favorable consideration of reference (c), asking for B-24 landplane bombers at once in place of the 17 PBV-3 planes now here, is earnestly recommended. This is a small part of the necessary increase, but, as pointed out in the reference, it is relatively easy to do and it will make an important immediate improvement in the picture.

11. The request of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for a total of 200 heavy bombers, with which the Commander-in-Chief concurred in reference (d), is amply justified. It must be recognized that renewed attack will almost certainly be in force as great or greater than that of the first attack, which included at least four aircraft carriers, and it may in addition be divided. The only way in which to have any assurance of decisive effect on major enemy attack is to be prepared to strike a heavy blow. But the only available shore-based striking force consists of 18 B-17's, held in reserve daily for this purpose, and such patrol planes, neither searching nor undergoing maintenance, as are not in use for special daily missions. The resultant air striking force is literally trivial. It would be practically useless against surface forces comparable to those that were in this area on 7 December. Its effect could not possibly be decisive. With 200 heavy bombers on hand, however, availability of a powerful striking force for all contingencies can be continuously assured.

12. In all of the foregoing, *Hawaiian air defense* alone has been considered. Any plans for any other uses in the Pacific area for the recommended types of aircraft must include provision of appropriate numbers of additional aircraft.

13. Returning to the immediate situation: With present limited numbers of searching and striking planes we are constantly confronted with the dilemma resulting from the relative futility of either effective search at the expense of striking force or useful striking force at the expense of search. There is no answer to this except more planes. Unless we are to [82] play the inevitably losing game of local air defense alone, the recommended total increases for both the patrol wings and the Hawaiian air force must be soon provided. Meanwhile, it is reiterated that *any* immediate increase for either will vitally improve the present situation.

14. Transmission via registered clipper airmail is authorized for this document.

C. W. NIMITZ.

Copy to:  
ComAirScoFor  
ComPatWing TWO  
BuAero  
Opnav  
Comdg. Gen'l., Hawaiian Dept.

[83]

PATROL WING TWO,  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
*Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 30, 1941.*

PW2/A16-3  
(0033)

Secret

From: The Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (The Commander Patrol Wing TWO)

To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Via: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Long Range, Landplane, Bombers for Scouting in Hawaiian Area; Recommendation for Assignment of.

Reference: (a) Comairscofor Confidential Letter A4-1 (0755) dated December 18, 1941.

Enclosure:

- (A) Determination of Search Group Requirements.
- (B) Memorandum of Air Corps Liaison Officer.

1. By reference (a) the Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, set forth the need for long range landplane bombers for use initially as scouts in protective searches from Oahu, and stated briefly the advantages and further uses of such aircraft. It is the purpose of this letter to amplify the presentation of this



subject and to present facts which will prove beyond reasonable doubt that the immediate allocation of such equipment to Patrol Wing is vital, not only to defense, but also to future offensive air operations.

2. There are currently 78 PBY aircraft available for flight in the Hawaiian Area, of which 34 are recently received reinforcements. Present search operations require 30 of the available PBY planes to conduct a daily 700 mile radius search from Oahu, covering a 240 degree sector. The remaining 120 degrees is covered daily, with concomitant serious reduction of offensive power by B-17 aircraft of the Army searching to 800 miles; or by B-17 aircraft and VO-VS of VJ aircraft, the latter searching to 200-300 miles, when the B-17s available for search are less than 16. It is evident that such a daily search is only partially effective. The lack of experience and training of Army Air Corps flight crews in performing long range protective search missions over water is a condition which was naturally to be expected. The result of this has the effect of throwing the major part of the burden of search on the Patrol Plane units in this area, and rightly so, for, at the present time, the few long range bombardment aircraft available to the Army in this area, even if used solely as a striking force, are totally inadequate. It is imperative that Hawaiian-based Patrol Wings be provided with sufficient aircraft to take over Oahu searches and to [84] release Army bombers for the stand-by as a striking force. As a guide to the material required a study has been made as outlined in enclosure (A), based upon utilizing PBY aircraft, and upon alternate long range equipment having cruising speeds of 150 and 200 knots. The results of this study are tabulated below:

	PBY	150-knot airplane (4 engine)	200-knot airplane (4 engine)
Radius of daily search.....	800	840	860
Number searching planes daily (25 mile visibility).....	50	54	54
Flight time per search plane-hrs.....	16.5	11.7	9.0
Total plane hours per month.....	24,750	19,415	14,580
Total number of planes required.....	150	162	162
Number of flight crews required.....	225	243	243
Engine changes per month.....	82.5	129.6	97.2
Spare engines required.....	182	286	214
Fuel consumption per month-gal.....	1,980,000	2,912,250	2,916,000
Average search effectiveness (estimated).....	50%	60%	60-70%
With A. S. V. (40-mile visibility assumed)			
Radius of daily search.....	800	840	860
Number searching planes daily.....	32	34	34
Flight time per search plane-hrs.....	16.5	11.7	9.0
Total plane hours per month.....	15,840	11,934	9,180
Total number of planes required.....	96	102	102
Number of flight crews required.....	134	153	153
Engine changes per month.....	52.8	79.5	61.2
Spare engines required.....	117	175	137
Fuel consumption per month-gal.....	1,267,000	1,790,100	1,836,000
Average search effectiveness (estimated).....	75%	95%	100%

3. Conclusions which may be drawn from the above tabulations and from the study, enclosure (A), are as follows:

(a) PBY aircraft are *too slow* for the mission required of them. Their lack of speed not only reduces search effectiveness because of their inability to cover the required area during [85] daylight hours, but also because the excessive duration of flight increases pilot and crew fatigue. The only alternative is to provide planes of sufficient speed to conduct the required search in daylight hours.

(b) Regardless of how fast or how many planes are available, the effectiveness of the search is dependent upon visibility. All planes utilized for search should be provided with A. S. V. equipment with which search effectiveness can be increased to near 100%, despite low visibility. Not only would A. S. V. equipment make the search effective but, by permitting wider coverage by each plane, would reduce the numbers of planes and flight crews required. This, combined, with shorter flight hours, would reduce fuel consumption, engine changes, spare engines required, and other maintenance, as well as reducing crew fatigue. It is clear that A. S. V. equipment also is a vital requirement and should be provided on a not-to-delay basis.



(c) The PB2Y-3 airplane has a cruising speed of about 150 knots and adequate range. But the operation of 102 PB2Y-3 airplanes presents more difficulties than the operation of a similar number of landplane bombers. PB2Y-3s are not fast enough. They are not immediately available. While a number of these planes are needed for certain types of missions, the immediate requirement for search is for landplanes of yet higher speed.

(d) Surveying the landplane field two types are available; the B-17 and the B-24. Experience with the B-17 on search has been disappointing. Their cruising speed at the low altitudes required during search is about 155 knots. In order to search to radius 800, auxiliary tanks must be installed in the bomb bays, precluding the carrying of bombs.

(e) The B-24 airplane most nearly meets the requirements of effective search in this area. Available information on characteristics is given in enclosure (B). Provision of 102 B-24 airplanes would provide not only for effective search but also would provide a formidable reserve striking force. It is believed that a number of B-24 aircraft could be made available immediately by diversion from Lend Lease aircraft awaiting delivery. Such diversion is considered vital to the defense of Oahu.

[86] (f) From actual flight experience of our pilots in B-17-E aircraft, I am convinced that experienced patrol plane crews can readily and in short order take over the operation of four-engine landplane bombers.

(g) Some fields are available and others can shortly be made available in the Hawaiian Group which are suitable for, or capable of rapid expansion as necessary to accommodate 102 B-24 Navy long range landplane bombers. These fields include Kaneohe, Ewa, Maui, Barking Sands on Kauai, and Hilo Airport at Hawaii.

#### 4. Recommendations:

(a) It is strongly recommended that at least 102 B-24 bombers be allocated to Hawaiian-based Patrol Squadrons, and delivered as rapidly as possible.

(b) Immediate equipping with B-24s of the three patrol squadrons now on the West Coast equipping with PBV-5As is recommended as the first increment.

(c) For the second increment, it is recommended that the 17 PBV-3s now in this area, 7 of which are now due for overhaul, be replaced with 24 B-24s, Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO and Patrol Squadron TWENTY-ONE flying the PBV-3s in succession to the West Coast, and, after a brief training period, returning with B-24s.

(d) The following equipment should be provided for these planes on a *not to delay* basis:

- (1) A. S. V. equipment.
- (2) Converter for use with YE homing device.
- (3) I. F. F. equipment.

/s/ P. N. L. BELLINGER.

#### Enclosure "A"

[87] *Determination of search group requirements*

#### A. PBV Aircraft

##### Assumptions

1. Best sustained speed of enemy carrier—27 knots.
2. Enemy carrier can launch an attack at a maximum distance of 300 miles.
3. PBV ground speed during search averages 100 knots.
4. Duration of daylight and dark:

(At Pearl)	Dec. 22	June 22
Daylight.....	11.0 hrs.....	13.6 hrs.
Dark.....	13.0 hrs.....	10.4 hrs.

5. Daily search must cover a radius such that enemy cannot reach the 300-mile launching circle the following morning before the daily search reaches the 300-mile circle.

6. Aircraft depart on search daily at dawn.



Work	22 Dec.	22 June
Launching Radius.....	300	300
Enemy's night run (27×13).....	351	(27×10.4) 281
Enemy's day run before search reaches 300 mile circle: $\frac{300}{100} \times 27$ .....	81	81
Radius to cover effective at dark.....	732	662

Let  $a$  = hours of daylight remaining when plane starts return leg.

Radius of search required is (r)  $732 + 27(a)$        $662 + 27(a)$

[88] Radius of search plus transfer (50 miles for 25 mile visibility) equals distance plane goes before starting return leg, equals hours of daylight minus  $a$ , times plane speed.

$$732 + 27a + 50 = (11 - a) 100$$

$$a = 2.5 \text{ hrs.}$$

$$662 + 27a + 50 = (13.6 - a) 100$$

$$a = 5.1$$

Radius of search (r)	$732 + 27(2.5)$	$662 + 27(5.1)$
Radius of search r	799.5	799.7

#### Conclusions

1. Radius of search 800 miles. Daily flight time 16.5hrs/plane.
2. For radius of visibility of 25 miles requires 50 search planes daily and a total search force of 150 planes.
3. Since radius of visibility usually averages 15 miles, search effectiveness is about 60%. On 22 December plane flies last 550 miles in darkness. This reduces to 290 miles on 22 June. Effectiveness of search is further reduced by this to an estimated 50% coverage over the entire year.
4. Plane hrs/mo—24,750 hrs.
5. Fuel consumption/mo (at 80 gal/hr)—1,980,000 gal.
6. Engines changes per month (at 600 hrs)—82.5. Spare engines required (220% of monthly changes)—182.

#### [89] B. *PBY Aircraft with A. S. V. (Radar)*

Intelligence reports (AirBatFor Summary of Air Operations No. 6-41A) stated that British A. S. V. equipment in Coastal Command aircraft has the following performance.

##### *Forward antenna system*

Range—30 miles.

Cone of search—60° in azimuth (30° on either side of the beam); directly ahead and almost vertically downward.

##### *Lateral antenna system*

Range—80 miles on both sides.

Cone of search—18° in azimuth (9° on either side of the beam); 30° in elevation; 30° in depression."

Weight 290 lbs)

From information received on the A. S. V. equipment being installed in our PBY airplanes, it is understood that the performance is adversely affected by lack of British-made cable and that the performance obtained, for this and other installation reasons, is reduced, actual results varying between 10 and 40 miles range. Equipment installed in PBM airplanes however is reported as effective up to 70 miles, and it is expected that somewhat better results may be expected from PBY airplanes when British cable, now on order is installed. (First shipment sunk). Assuming that A. S. V. equipment may be depended upon for an



effective range of at least 40 miles, the following benefits would result from installation of A. S. V. in PBV aircraft:

For 40 mile A. S. V. "visibility"

1. Reduce number of planes required for daily search from 50 to 32.
2. Increase search effectiveness from an average of 50% to about 75%.
3. Reduce plane hours per month for search from 24,750 to 15,840; reduce fuel consumption for search from 1,980,000 to 1,267,000 gallons per month; reduce engine changes per month from 82.5 to 52.8.
- [90] 4. Reduce total planes required from 150 to 100; spare engines required from 182 to 117.
5. Reduce crew fatigue and number of plane crews required.

Conclusions

1. The immediate installation of A. S. V. in search aircraft is vital to successful protective aircraft search. It will greatly reduce the material and personnel required for any search.

C. 150 knot 4 engined aircraft

Assumptions as before, except for 150 knot ground speed of search aircraft

Work	22 Dec.	22 June
Launching radium.....	300	300
Enemy's night run (27×13).....	351 (27×10.4)	281
Enemy's daylight run before succeeding day's search reached 300 mile circle: $\frac{300}{150} \times 27$ .....	54	54
Radium to cover effective at dark.....	705	635
705 80 27a=150 (11-a) 635 80 27a=150 (13.6-a) a=4.87 a=7.5		
Radius of search r=840		r=835

Conclusions

1. Radius of search 840 miles. Daily flight time 11.7 hours/plane.
- [91] 2. With A. S. V. equipped planes, requires 34 search planes daily (40 mile A. S. V. visibility) and a total force of 102 planes; without A. S. V. 54 planes daily (25 mile visibility) and a total force of 162 planes.
3. Search effectiveness 100% with A. S. V.; 60% without.
4. Plane hrs/mo;
 

With A. S. V.....	11, 934
Without A. S. V.....	19, 415
5. Fuel consumption/mo: (at 150 gal/hr)
 

With A. S. V.....	1, 709, 100
Without A. S. V.....	2, 912, 250
6. Engine changes/mo: (at 600 hrs) (4 eng/plane)
 

With A. S. V.....	79. 5
Without A. S. V.....	129. 6
- Spare engines required: (220% of monthly changes)
 

With A. S. V.....	175
Without A. S. V.....	289

D. 200 knot 4 engined aircraft

Assumptions as for A except for 200 knot ground speed of search aircraft.



	22 Dec.	22 June
Launching radius.....	300	300
Enemy's night run.....	351	281
Enemy's daylight run before succeeding day's search reaches 300 mile circle:		
$\frac{300}{200} \times 27$ .....	41	41
Radius to cover <i>effective at dark</i> .....	692	622
[92] $692+80+27a=200$ (11-a) $622+80+27a=200$ (13.6-a)		
a=6.3		a=8.9
r=860		r=862

### Conclusions

1. Radius of search 860 miles. Daily flight time 9 hours.
  2. Requires 34 A. S. V. equipped planes daily; or 54 non-A. S. V.-equipped.
- Total force required:
- |                      |            |
|----------------------|------------|
| With A. S. V.....    | 102 planes |
| Without A. S. V..... | 162 planes |
3. Search effectiveness 100% with A. S. V.; 60% without. All search made during daylight.
  4. Plane hours/month:

With A. S. V.....	9,180
Without A. S. V.....	14,580
  5. Fuel consumption/month (at 200 gallons/hour):

With A. S. V.....	1,836,000
Without A. S. V.....	2,916,000
  6. Engine changes/month (at 600 hours):

With A. S. V.....	61.2
Without A. S. V.....	97.2
- Spare engines required (220% of monthly changes):
- |                      |     |
|----------------------|-----|
| With A. S. V.....    | 137 |
| Without A. S. V..... | 214 |

[93] 1. Flight crews should not be required to fly more often than one day in three: i. e., fly one day, rest one day, stand-by one day.

2. Operating policy requires that all available planes not under maintenance be manned and ready for take-off from 30 minutes before to one hour after sunrise, and from one hour before to 30 minutes after sunset. All available planes are on one hour's notice otherwise during daylight, and on 4 hour's notice otherwise at night. This requires services of one crew to stand-by each available airplane on the ground.

3. To provide for special missions in addition to protective search, at least three times the number of aircraft required for daily search should be provided.

4. Initially a minimum of 150% plane crews will be required. The excess over one crew per plane will be utilized to provide a surplus for rest status one day in three and for conducting training until two crews per plane are available.

[94] *Confidential*

PATROL WING TWO,  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 30, 1941.

Memorandum to Lieutenant Commander Coe, USN  
From: Major W. J. Holzapfel, U. S. A.

The following information on the B-24 airplane is gathered from pilots on the ferry command in the United States and from mechanics who were on the ferry command to England who used this type of airplane:

B-24 is equipped with Pratt and Whitney Twin row engines Model R-1830 with two stage engine driven blowers and developing 1250 horsepower during take-off.

The gas capacity of these airplanes is 3,100 gallons divided into two 1,550 gallon wing tanks. These tanks are not bullet proof. The Consolidated Corporation however is planning on putting in bullet proof tanks which will cut down the gas capacity to 2,490 gallons.



On these trips the thought of fuel economy is never considered. The airplanes were cruised between 29 and 31 inches of mercury, 2,000 RPM at altitudes of 7-10,000 feet. Carburetor, mixture was set at lean. Fuel consumption at these altitudes at these settings, which is considered maximum cruising, was 150 gallons gasoline per hour and the indicated air speed was between 180-200 statute miles per hour.

This airplane has two bomb bays each with 10 bomb stations. Capacity of the bomb bays is 8,000 pounds of bombs. The armament is composed of 9 .50 cal. machine guns and 1 .30.

The weight empty of these airplanes is 30,000 pounds. The authorized gross weight of this airplane (maximum limit as set by manufacturer) is 57,000 pounds. However, conversations with a mechanic who made a trip to England brought out the fact that one such airplane was once loaded to 72,000 pounds and it is reported that the English have loaded one of these airplanes to 83,000 pounds. No difficulties were found in take-off or flying quality of this airplane.

/s/ W. J. HOLTZAPFEL

Deferred—Secret

[95] Date: 29 Nov 41

Originator: OpNav

Action: CincPac

28054

Arrangements described in your 280627 appear to be best that can be done under the circumstances but suggest advisability of transferring VMF 221 from San Diego to Hawaii via Saratoga X War Dept will instruct Comgen Hawdept to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in support of Marines X War Dept will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of AA defenses but it is doubtful if much improvement is possible soon X Marine Corps will shortly receive 16 37 MM AA guns and receive ammunition in February do you desire these guns for Midway and Wake X Request air mail report on present defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future

Ref: 11-862; Wright now at Wake . . discharge Marine planes crews and material . . . . . afterwards proceeds to Midway to land similar items . . . etc . . .

[96] Date: 28 Nov 1941

From: CincPac

To: PacFlt

Information to: OpNav (RDO)

280355

Classification—Secret

Exercise extreme vigilance against submarines in operating areas vicinity Oahu especially during sortie and entrance X Our submarines will conduct submerged operations in areas cast 5 and cast 7 only proceeding elsewhere on surface X Depth bomb all submarine contacts suspected to be hostile in Oahu operating areas except areas cast 5 and cast 7.

[97] CinC File No.

A4-3/QL/0243

Confidential

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., Feb. 11, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Submarine Contact 3-4 February 1941—Report of.

Reference: (a) Base Force Operation Plan No. 1-41.

Enclosure:

(A) Copy of Comdesbatfor Conf. Ltr. file A8 Serial 0187 of 7 Feb. 1941 with its enclosure.



(B) Copy of Comdesbatfor Conf. Ltr. file A8 Serial 0189 of 7 February 1941.

1. Forwarded herewith is the report of the Commanding Officer, U. S. S. DALE, of a sonic contact experienced off Diamond Head on 3-4 February (Enclosure (A)), and a supplementary report thereto (Enclosure (B)).

2. It will be noted that the contact was developed outside the Defensive Sea Area as established by General Order No. 118, and that at no time was there any sonic indication of a contact within that area.

3. The concurrent air operations conducted with the destroyers are shown in paragraph 3 of enclosure (A) and in the supplementary report, (Enclosure (B)).

4. In this connection pertinent parts of reference (a) are quoted herewith to indicate the orders under which the destroyers maintaining the Channel Entrance Patrol operate:

"In case evidence of a submerged submarine is obtained maintain contact and report to Commander Base Force.

"Take no offensive action until directed, unless the submarine enters the Prohibited Area (Defensive Sea Area, General Order one hundred eighteen)."

[98] 5. The Commanding Officer of the DALE is an officer of considerable experience in sonic work. His reports and the despatches incident to the contact indicate that he is convinced contact was established with a submarine. Our own submarines were not operating in the area where the sonic contact was made.

6. It is interesting to note that Destroyers had been on patrol in the particular, and adjacent area since 1800 on 2 February. A submarine in the vicinity when contact was made would, therefore, likely have operated submerged from that time and during previous daylight hours. It is noted too, that contact was retained for about 24 hours, beginning 0600 on 3 February; that a daylight period followed the loss of contact; that a patrol was maintained on the night of 5 February; and a search was conducted on 5 February. This totals a submerged operating period well in excess of anything that might have been expected.

7. When the Destroyer reported that the contact appeared definitely to be a submarine, the Commander-in-Chief was inclined to order depth charges dropped in the area. However, he realized that to do so might create an international incident of serious consequence at the time. As there seemed every reason to expect that contact could be maintained, and that the suspected submarine would eventually be forced to surface, he directed the Destroyers to retain contact and drop depth charges only in the event that the suspected submarine took aggressive action.

8. After a careful study of all attending circumstances, the Commander-in-Chief does not subscribe to the contention of the Commanding Officer, U. S. S. DALE that contact was established with a submarine. He cannot visualize any motive for a foreign submarine to be operating submerged in this particular area. The reported propeller noises, may have resulted from internal noises in the Destroyers themselves, or from the propellers of small craft [99] in the area. Attention is also invited to the statement in paragraph 3 (a) of enclosure (A), regarding the presence of fish in that area. There had been also a decided change in the direction of the wind just previous to this experience, with attending cooler weather. This may have introduced a temperature gradient in the water in this area.

9. It is the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to continue the present anti-submarine patrol. He sees no reason to expand it incident to this experience. He will continue to operate under the present directive as quoted in paragraph 4.

10. If the Department does not approve of the action taken, the Commander-in-Chief will be delighted to issue orders for offensive action whenever a contact similar to the one reported is made. In that event it seems wise to extend the limit of the Defensive Sea Area as prescribed in General Order No. 118, and to make notification of same.

[s] H. E. Kimmel  
H. E. KIMMEL



[100] File A8  
Serial 0187  
CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES FLEET  
DESTROYERS, BATTLE FORCE  
U. S. S. DETROIT, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., Feb. 7, 1941.

From: Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Submarine Contact 3-4 February 1941—Report of.

Enclosure: (A) Report of Commanding Officer, U. S. S. DALE.

1. Enclosure (A) is the report of the subject contact submitted by the Commanding Officer, U. S. S. DALE who was designated as the officer in charge of the operations by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force. This report incorporates the observations of the following destroyers which were in company with the DALE—AYLWIN, HULL, LAMSON and MAHAN.

2. A separate report submitted by the Commanding Officer, U. S. S. LAMSON, adds nothing to the enclosure. The MAHAN is now at sea and will be directed to submit a report immediately upon her return to Pearl Harbor.

3. Concurrently with the operations of destroyers the following air operations were conducted:

(a) The area in the vicinity of the DALE was patrolled by the DETROIT planes during the forenoon and afternoon of February 3. The DETROIT aviators report that at about 1030 some porpoises were observed between the destroyers and ahead of them and shortly thereafter several blackfish were observed on the port bow of the DALE. They further report sighting several blackfish at about 1400 in the same vicinity.

(b) Patrol planes patrolled the area throughout the day of 3 February.

(c) The sea area within a radius of 100 miles of Pearl Harbor was searched by patrol planes during the forenoon of 4 February.

(d) No reports of sighting a strange submarine were received from any aircraft.

M. F. DRAEMEL.

[101] File  
A8  
Serial 0189  
Confidential

UNITED STATES FLEET  
DESTROYERS, BATTLE FORCE

U. S. S. DETROIT, Flagship,  
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., February 7, 1941.

From: Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Submarine Contract 3-4 February 1941—Report of.

Reference: (a) Comdesbatfor ltr. A8 Serial 0187 dated February 7, 1941.

1. Supplementing reference (a), the following additional data are submitted.

2. The first report of contact by DALE was received at 0813, February 3, 1941. DALE was immediately directed to maintain contact. The contact report was retransmitted for information to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Commander Base Force, Commander Battleship Division ONE (who was approaching Pearl Harbor enroute from the mainland), and all Task Group Commanders of Task Force One then operating at sea. Patrol planes were directed to investigate and the patrol plane Task Group Commander established a patrol over the area, which patrol was maintained until darkness 3 February.

3. The AYLWIN was in company with the DALE from 0736 to 0854, at which time she proceeded on other assigned duty and was replaced by HULL about 1015.

4. The area in the vicinity of the DALE was patrolled by DETROIT planes during the forenoon and afternoon of 4 February.

5. When the DETROIT finished her scheduled exercises about noon, 3 February, she proceeded to visual contact with DALE. In reply to direct questions DALE stated that the contact was considered to be a submarine and that the HULL (in company) concurred.



6. Destroyer Division NINE was directed to rendezvous with Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, at 1700, at which time the LAMSON and MAHAN were directed to assist the DALE and HULL, and the DRAYTON and FLUSSER to join Battleship Division THREE as antisubmarine screen. The four destroyers engaged in the contact were directed to maintain contact and to take offensive action only if attacked. They were authorized to use navigational lights, and all other units directed to keep clear. The DETROIT then proceed to the Maui range for D. G. calibration.

[102] 7. During the night reports of losing and making contact were received intermittently. In response to the question as to whether or not there was good reason to believe that the contact was not a whale, the DALE advised that good contacts were checked by several ships and propeller sounds had been heard.

8. At daylight of the 4th the routine patrol plane flight covering the operating areas was initiated.

9. At 0725, February 4, the DALE reported contact lost. After a reasonable length of time in which to ascertain whether or not this was a repetition of previous experiences, it seemed established that the contact would not be regained. At 0925 the patrol planes were directed to search the sea area within a radius of 100 miles of Pearl Harbor.

10. At 1120 DALE and HULL were directed to return to Pearl Harbor, leaving the LAMSON and MAHAN to continue the search. The DRAYTON and FLUSSER were directed to join the LAMSON and MAHAN. These four destroyers continued the search until dark at which time the search was abandoned.

11. At 1800, 4 February, the destroyer offshore patrol was established for the sortie of Task Force Two the next morning. Destroyer Division NINE was directed to patrol Areas S-1 and S-2 outside of the areas of the offshore patrol.

12. After the contact was lost at 0725, February 4, no further evidence of the presence of a submarine was forthcoming from either destroyers or patrol planes.

13. Any estimate or conjecture as to whether a submarine was in this area appears of little real value. Three ships reported hearing propeller noises; two of these reported hearing propeller noises on two occasions. The Commanding Officer of the DALE has had two years experience in working with our own submarines. His sound operators are experienced. If these reports were correct the propeller noises can be explained only by the actual presence of a submarine.

M. F. DRAEMEL.

10/Fs

[103] In Reply Refer to File No. DD353/A9-8/S68 (57)  
Confidential

U. S. S. DALE, PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,  
February 7, 1941.

From: Commanding Officer.  
To: Commander Destroyers, BATTLE FORCE.  
Subject: Submarine Contact 3-4 February, 1941, report of.

1. On Monday 3 February 1941, the U. S. S. Dale was on station as Off Shore Patrol in Sector 3. Two Radiomen, graduates of the sound school and qualified operators were on Echo Ranging Watch.

2. At about 0657, a contact was reported and developed. This contact was maintained until 0638, 4 February 1941. A chronological record of events is forwarded herewith:—

<i>Zone (Time)</i>	<i>Event</i>
<i>February 3, 1941</i>	
0657	Made contact on QCA—stopped to develop. Maintained contact.
0720	Determined that submarine was on Southerly Course at very slow speed. Notified Commander Destroyer Division TWO in Aylwin of contact.
0736	Position Lat. 20°09.3' N. long. 157°50' W. U. S. S. Aylwin approached and made contact, verifying Dale contact.



- 0736-  
0850 Aylwin and Dale maintained contact.  
0850 Position Lat. 21°05.1' N. Long 157°50' W.  
0854 U. S. S. Aylwin ceased tracking and proceeded to station as Inner Patrol, ordering Hull as her relief.  
0929 Lost contact. Submarine apparently circled. Last range 900 yards. Position Lat. 21°02.7' N. Long. 157°50.3' W.  
1000 Regained contact. Range 4100 yards. Lat. 21°02.3' N. Long. 157°50.8' W.  
[104]  
1024 U. S. S. Hull made contact. Range 2,100 yards.  
1035 Position Lat. 21°02.3' N. and Long. 157°53.4' W.  
1041 U. S. S. Hull lost contact.  
1053 U. S. S. Dale lost contact. Submarine apparently circled. Last range 1,550 yards. Position Lat. 21°03' N. Long 157°54' W.  
1125 U. S. S. Dale regained contact. Position Lat. 21°03.8 N. Long. 157°55' W. Range 3,100 yards.  
1144 U. S. S. Dale lost contact. Range 1,000 yards.  
1240 U. S. S. Dale and Hull regained contact. Range 2,200 yards. Submarine apparently circling.  
1250 Lost Contact. Position Lat. 21°00.5' N. Long. 157°55.4' W. Range 1,800 yards.  
1350 Dale regained contact and heard propeller noises.  
1353 Hull regained contact. Dale heard propeller noises.  
1414 Hull lost contact.  
1458 Maintaining contact. Position Lat. 21°02' N. Long. 157°55.8' W.  
1536 Position Lat. 21°01.7' N. Long. 157°55.3' W.  
1622 Lost contact. Position Lat. 21°01.8' N. Long. 157°54.4' W. Range 1,500 yards.  
1705 Dale regained contact. Position Lat. 21°00.3' N. Long. 157°55.3' W. Range 1,900 yards.  
[105] 1747 Dale lost contact. Range 2,200 yards.  
1800 Lamson and Mahan joined Task Unit formed scouting line interval 1,000 yards.  
1847 Dale regained contact. Range 1,500 yards.  
1900 Submarine appeared to pass through formation on a southerly heading.  
1913 Lamson made contact. Range 2,200 yards.  
1917 Dale position Lat. 21°07' N. Long. 157°51.5' W.  
1921 Mahan reported propeller noises.  
1935 Mahan lost contact.  
1938 Lamson heard slow beat of propellers.  
1945 Lamson and Mahan lost contact.  
2000 Dale position Lat. 21°05.3' N. Long. 157°50.9' W.  
2140 Lamson detached to investigate shore line east of Diamond Head.  
2354 Dale regained contact. Range 540 yards.

*February 4, 1941*

- 0000 Dale maintaining previous contact.  
0036 Dale position Lat. 21°04' N. Long. 157°54.3' W.  
0115 Mahan made contact.  
0127 Hull made contact. Range 2,000 yards.  
0130 Dale position Lat. 21°06.8' N. Long. 157°53.3' N.  
0150 Dale and Mahan contacts show submarine in same position.  
[106] 0152 Mahan reported hearing propeller noises.  
0158 Dale position Lat. 21°07' N. Long. 157°53' W.  
0209 Hull reported range 400 yards.  
0247 Hull reported range 1,400 yards, Lamson 2,100 yards.  
0250 Dale position Lat. 21°07.5' N. Long. 157°52' W. Dale, Lamson and Mahan lost contact, Hull maintaining contact; range 1,350 yards.  
0326 Dale regained contact. Range 2,600 yards.  
0328 Mahan regained contact. Range 4,100 yards.  
0345 Dale position Lat. 21°05.2' N. Long. 157°52.7' W. Range 1,800 yards.  
0400 Dale contact, range 1,550 yards. Hull, contact 1,700 yards.  
0413 Hull lost contact.



0415 Hull regained contact.  
 0431 Hull lost contact.  
 0441 All ships lost contact, last range from Dale 2,600 yards.  
 0555 Hull regained contact. Range 2,200 yards.  
 0614 Dale regained contact. Range 2,450 yards.  
 0638 Hull and Dale lost contact. Lat. 21°00 N. Long. 157°53' W.  
 0815 Went head continuing search without results.  
 0921 Sighted smoke bombs on starboard beam, being dropped by planes.  
 [107] Turned right into column at 20 knots, course 103° T. to investigate.  
 0934 Lamson and Mahan detached to investigate smoke bombs being dropped on starboard beam.  
 0935 Sighted four sampans ranging from dead ahead to broad on the starboard bow.  
 0946 Changed course to pass close aboard one of sampans which was making about 15 knots and apparently attempting to evade.  
 0955 Sighted about ten men in sampan.  
 0958 Passed close aboard sampan Kasura Maru number FJ82.  
 1000 Changed course to rejoin Lamson and Mahan to continue search in area S-1.  
 1034 Formed scouting line course 180° T. scouting interval 1000 yards scouting speed 10 knots. Started echo ranging.  
 1125 Changed course to 270° T.  
 1132 Changed course to 000° T.  
 1215 Received message to return to port.

J. P. WOMBLE, Jr.

Secret

[108] Date: 28 Nov. 1941.  
 Originator: HELENA.  
 COMTASGR 1.5.  
 COMTASKFOR 1.  
 Action: COMTASGR 1.5; COMTASKFOR 1.  
 Information: CINCPAC; COMTASKFOR 2.  
 280835

Radar operator without knowledge CINCPAC 280355/6 positive that a submarine was in area cast 9 during HELENA firing approach about 1900.

[109] From: Alusna, Batavia.  
 Date: 5 Dec. 1941.  
 Addresses: OPNAV.  
 031030

From Thorpe for Mills War Dept. Code intercept:—Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain United States; north wind cloudy Russia; West wind clear England with attack on Thailand, Malay, and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.

Top Secret

Secret